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 Lawmakers are contemplating making changes to patent law and procedure to curb abusive 
litigation and demand practices. One of the most important constituents for them to keep in mind is 
small, innovative companies. The impact of the patent system on startups, and in particular high-tech 
startups, is crucial because they are a key source of new jobs and innovation. According to Engine and 
the Kau!man Foundation, “Though they start lean, new high-tech companies grow rapidly in the early 
years, adding thousands of jobs along the way.”1 
 Startups also have a unique perspective on patent assertion, with the potential to be helped as 
well as harmed by entities that assert patents as a business, referred to in this report interchangeably 
as patent assertion entities (PAEs) and non-practicing entities (NPEs).2  Companies with less than $10M 
in revenue comprise 55% of unique defendants to PAE suits. Startups, with their slim margins, focused 
operations, and high rates of innovation, can arguably least a!ord to engage in expensive litigation to 
defend against patent claims or stop incumbents from copying their innovations. But they can also gain 
from being able to monetize their patents through NPEs.3 
 The "rst part of this report describes the experiences of startups with patent assertion based on 
surveys of about 300 venture capitalists and venture-backed startups conducted in 2013. It also reports 
on companion surveys of patent litigators and large-company patent counsel in 2013, and a non-random, 
non-representative survey of startups conducted in 2012 for a total of over 1,100 respondents. Due to the 
di#culty of reaching a representative population, these results are not generalizable to all start-ups and 
startup investors, but instead serve as a window into their experiences and views.  The second part of the 
report describes existing and potential legislative, judicial, and market-based responses and recommends 
how they may be tailored to better meet the needs of startups and resource-poor companies. 
Executive Summary
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According to survey responses, patents for novel 
inventions play a generally positive and at times crucial 
role for startups. 3ey help to transfer technology, 
enable investment, and improve exits, particularly in 
bio/pharma industries. But patent assertions by NPEs, 
which at times hit startups when they are least able 
to 4ght them—on the eve of a funding or acquisition 
event, or, 40% of the time, in the context of the startups’ 
customers—can have signi4cant and at times devastating 
impacts on companies. 3ough partnering with NPEs 
to monetize patents can be bene4cial to companies as 
well, the bene4ts do not appear to o5set the harms, 
according to survey responses and VC interviewees 
whose companies had been sold to and been sued by 
NPEs.4 Furthermore, many survey respondents do not 
4nd these to be socially productive assertions—but 
rather on the basis of patents that, though they may be 
valid, are viewed as frivolous or overbroad. 
3ough the risks associated with patents were described 
as feeling “unbounded,” startups are routinely expected 
to absorb these risks in their dealings with acquirers, 
investors, and customers. Overall, these assertions have 
added friction to technology transactions, reduced 
the value of pursued startups, and triggered large 
indemnities, according to study subjects. 
More speci4cally, we found: 
Finding 1: Based on survey responses, 75% of surveyed 
venture capitalists (VCs) and 20% of venture-backed 
startups with patent experience have been impacted 
by an NPE demand; nearly 90% of all tech VCs have 
been impacted. 3e demand was based on the startup’s 
adoption of another’s technology 40% of the time. 
Low quality and so6ware patents were identi4ed as 
problematic. 
Finding 2: Although NPE assertions are perceived as 
motivated primarily by money, respondents reported 
routinely experiencing non-4nancial consequences 
including delays in hiring, meeting milestones, and 
business line pivots and exits.
Finding 3: Most VC respondents believe patents are 
important for innovation. An estimated 5% of startups 
have sold their patents to NPEs, experiencing positive 
bene4ts from doing so. However, most surveyed VCs, 
including the small number whose companies have sold 
to NPEs, believe that NPEs are harmful for innovation.
Finding 4: Startup concerns with patent enforcement 
go beyond NPEs and extend to the disadvantages 
startups su5er relative to larger incumbents as a result 
of poor patent quality, high costs, and delays associated 
with the patent system, survey respondents told us. 3e 
inability of startups to defend their own patents and 
suits brought by “patent predators,” larger companies 
that sue with anti-competitive motives, also presented 
speci4c concerns.
To ameliorate the harms of patent assertion on small 
companies, we recommend several interventions, 
keeping in mind the special needs of startups, who, 
with their fewer resources, less time, and greater focus 
on building the business, are at a relative disadvantage 
when patent processes are expensive, slow, or require 
deep patent expertise (or “patent game”-playing skills). 
3ese include:
Recommendation 1: Fully fund the PTO and its 
quality initiatives including tightening functional 
claiming and expand low-cost access to the PTO’s 
transitional program and other forms of post-grant 
review by reducing fees for small and micro entities and 
supporting and prioritizing collaborative challenges to 
patents asserted against large numbers of defendants, 
particularly by downstream users and small entities.
Recommendation 2:  Make patent cases about the 
merits, not about who can outlast or outspend the other 
side, by permitting more discretion in awarding fees and 
costs for non-core discovery and promoting uniformity 
and early dispositive rulings, for example by requiring 
the Patent Pilot Program to implement and measure the 
impact of best practices.
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Recommendation 3: Make patent risks more 
manageable for startups by requiring demand letters 
and complaints to disclose the real-party in interest, 
claim charts, related litigations and reviews, and licenses 
that could cover the target.
Recommendation 4: Make startups less attractive 
targets by limiting the liability of downstream users and 
the precedential value of the settlements signed by small 
companies. 
3e report concludes with a section that covers existing 
private and civil sector responses and tactics to help small 
companies in their own dealings with patent assertions, 
based on extensive research and interviews with defense 
service providers and experts in dealing with and 
bringing patent assertions against small companies. 
Appendix C-1 contains a listing of 17 defense service 
providers, their o5erings, target client pro4le, and how 
to engage them. Appendix C-2 describes and provides 
examples of a variety of di5erent tactics for defending 
against an NPE demand, including “4ghting back,” 
“laying low,” and publicity, as well as comments on their 
e5ectiveness by experienced in-house, company, and 
public interest lawyers.
Finally, we include the stories and advice of 4ve 
individuals—two investors, two startup executives, 
and one public interest lawyer—who have experienced 
patent litigation 4rst-hand.  3eir responses to assertion 
are varied—one found a market-based solution—
“partnering with a troll,” others saw their companies 
devalued and decimated by assertions, and another 
presents the perspective of his clients who cannot a5ord 
to use any of the patent system’s protection mechanisms. 
3rough them, the judges and policymakers that form 
the patent system can get a glimpse of how the patent 
system is being experienced in the world, and how it 
may be improved.
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Findings
BACKGROUND
 In order to formulate e!ective policymaking about patent assertion, it is important to understand 
its prevalence, operations, and impacts. Recognizing this, Congress ordered a study of patent assertions 
brought by non-practicing entities (NPEs), also referred to as patent assertion entities (PAEs),5 as part of 
the America Invents Act.6  Attempts to quantify patent assertion have focused on the prevalence of suits 
as a proportion of all patent litigations,7 the "nancial impact of NPEs on public and surveyed compa-
nies,8 the impact of NPEs on new product introduction,9 consumers, and innovation, and the prevalence 
of software patents among asserted patents.10 
 While these reports have drawn primarily upon operational company data about the patent 
system, there have been few e!orts to systematically collect company-level data about the impact on 
operations of patent assertion. This creates the risk that the policy making will be overly informed by 
anecdotal reports about the impacts of patent assertion, both positive11 and negative.12 
 In addition to the normal barriers that limit company-level data collection,13 including trade se-
crecy and the need to keep operational and "nancial information con"dential, there are a number of 
obstacles to companies publicly “telling their story.” Patent “trolling” is disfavored by the popular media 
and persons a#liated with certain well-known “trolls” have reported receiving threats.14 As a result, com-
panies that bene"t from patent assertion may be reluctant to speak publicly about their experiences.15 
 Those who have been on the receiving end of patent assertions face other barriers. When an as-
sertion is resolved, non-disclosure agreements are typically signed.16 Speaking publicly about an ongo-
ing dispute is unlikely to draw favor from the court.  Those who have spoken negatively about a patent 
troll in public believe they have been sued as a result of doing so.17 Stigma can make it di#cult for com-
panies to share their experiences.18  There may be concerns regarding clients and the sharing of sensitive 
company information.19  
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One of the most important constituents in the patent 
system are startups, as both generators of innovation 
and targets of patent suits. Startups are less likely to 
have the powerful lobbies and deep experience with the 
patent system than the large companies that typically 
front patent debates. But what happens to startups 
matters, and in particular high-tech startups. According 
to Engine and the Kau5man Foundation, “high-tech 
startups are a key driver of job creation throughout the 
United States.”20 Speci4cally, the high-tech sector has 
experienced a stronger share of new 4rm formation as 
compared to the rest of the private sector during the last 
three decades.21  
For this reason, this report focuses on the experience 
of startups with the patent system, as recounted by 
venture capitalists and others that invest in and oversee 
portfolios of startup companies and venture-backed 
startups themselves. While only a small fraction of 
companies receive VC funding every year, venture 
backed companies are a large source of employment, 
innovation, and new wealth.22 
To access startup and venture capital experience and 
opinions about patent assertion, I used anonymous, 
web-based surveys and conducted phone and email 
interviews with approximately 50 law-4rm lawyers, 
entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and large company 
lawyers. 3is report builds upon an existing survey of 
startups I conducted in 2012.23 3at survey generated 
223 respondents. Seventy-nine had received a patent 
assertion demand and several had monetized their 
patents through patent assertion entities (PAEs). While 
containing a number of suggestive 4ndings, the survey 
(referred to throughout the report as ‘Chien 2012’) was 
of a non-random, non-probability sample, distributed 
primarily openly to a universe of readers of technology 
and law and public interest/academic blogs that had to 
“opt-in” in order to take the survey. 
3is report draws from a new survey distributed in 
2013 primarily to a closed list of VC-backed startup 
companies and investors in startups generated from the 
Venture Xpert database and a comprehensive national 
list of venture capitalists, soliciting their feedback on the 
patent system and patent assertion. Although referred 
to throughout this report as a single “survey,” one of two 
versions of the survey was provided to each respondent 
depending on whether they self-identi4ed as working for 
a company or investing in companies. To create a more 
robust understanding of patent litigation dynamics, the 
report also draws upon companion surveys that were 
sent to legal counsel in large companies and in patent 
litigation law 4rms.  
As detailed in the Appendix A (Methodology), the 
respondent population included 307 venture capitalist 
or investors (“VCs”) and startups. 3irty-4ve of the 
startups had received a demand. 3e surveyed VC 
population skewed from the national average towards 
early stage investors and investors in bio/pharma and 
hardware/semiconductors. Of the startup participants, 
73% were founders/executives, 75% of companies 
reported revenue under $10M, and 93% reported fewer 
than 500 employees. Due to a low response rate, the 
results cannot be used to describe all companies. Still, 
the numeric results in combination with the open-ended 
comments o5ered by respondents allow us to provide 
a rich analysis of how venture-backed companies are 
experiencing the patent system. 
FINDINGS
Finding 1. Based on survey responses, about 
75% of venture capitalists and 20% of venture-
backed startups with patent experience have 
been impacted by an NPE demand; nearly 
90% of tech VCs have been impacted. !e 
demand was based on the startup’s adoption of 
another’s technology 40% of the time. Survey 
takers identi"ed low quality and so#ware 
patents as problematic. 
One objective of this study was to document how 
widespread the impacts of NPEs are among productive, 
innovative companies. Studies estimate the proportion 
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of NPE lawsuits as a percentage of all patent lawsuits 
4led recently to range from 45%24  to around 60%.25 
3e share of unique defendants to PAE suits that have 
annual revenues of $10M or less has been estimated to be 
around 55%.26  However, it is not clear what proportion 
of all companies is actually being impacted.27 Patent 
litigants are not representative of the general population 
of companies, but certain policy interventions could 
have broad impact. 
We asked VCs to estimate what percentage of their 
portfolio companies, if any, had received NPE demands, 
and asked startup executives to indicate whether they 
had received any NPE demands. 75% of VCs (N=114) 
indicated that at least some share of their portfolios was 
impacted. 3e share ranged signi4cantly by industry— 
close to 90% of technology VCs (N=66), and as few 
as 13% of bio/pharma or medical device VCs (N=23) 
reported having an a5ected portfolio. As re7ected in 
the surveyed population, technology investing has 
represented the bulk of venture capital investment for 
some time.28  
Based on taking midpoints from ranges that VCs gave, 
we estimated the share of impacted companies to be 20% 
(N=114). 20% was also the number reported among the 
surveyed startup population (N=171). 
Opportunistic Assertions
VC respondents described several patterns of assertion. 
O6en the timing seemed to be dictated by an event 
in the company’s development—publicity/success, an 
M&A or funding event, or the company’s IPO.29  3e 
strategy depended on the company’s pro4le—for 
example “when a Series A or Series B is announced, this 
puts the company ‘on the radar’ of NPEs,” said one VC 
respondent. 3e success of the company exposes the 
company to higher costs that are cheaper to avoid than 
pay: “If you are successful you will be sued since it is 
“When faced with the second suit, we knew we would spend all this money again to go into this entire process, and we 
would pay all that money and be worse o!. So even though we had won the "rst time, the second time it was much more 
attractive to settle—in the low seven "gures—than to "ght.
“We had run out of cash and were in talks with a Chinese company that didn’t want to deal with it. All of the arguments—
there’s just no way in hell a jury will pay attention it. We had agreed on the price of the company. But then the buyer used 
the lawsuit as leverage to get the price down on the order of $10 million due to the outstanding lawsuit– 20% of the value 
of the company. They said this is [a] $20M liability which was bogus. But we didn’t have the money to settle it.”
-Laura Smith, Intellectual Property Manager 
For full testimony, see Appendix B.
cheaper to settle than to 4ght. Once successful, you are 
sued with typical $500,000 - 1,000,000 type settlement 
even if the claim is completely worthless. Cost to defend 
is $1,500,000 plus, so we settle,” said another. 
But NPE demands were perceived to be triggered not 
only by success, but also vulnerability. According to one 
respondent: “the NPE saw the company had substantial 
funding, but not enough funding or revenue… to mount 
a prolonged legal defense. 3ey saw we were vulnerable 
and eager to settle to avoid distraction and cost.” 
Sometimes the objective is to sue not because there are 
funds, but because companies need funds: “publicity 
that our company was raising money prompted a troll 
to sue for patent infringement. 3ey knew a company 
ha[d] to buy them o5 if it is likely to raise new capital. No 
investor wants to make a new investment in a company 
charged with patent infringement. It’s a pretty common 
strategy.”  Having an outstanding patent lawsuit, even 
when the company’s case is strong and the value of the 
technology is low, can cause a company to be devalued 
signi4cantly, for example, by 20%.30  
Whatever the speci4c motive, a number of NPE 
assertions appear to be strategically timed in order 
to obtain settlements.  As the Managing Partner of 
a technology-focused private equity fund said in an 
interview, “NPEs have… become very adept at suing 
at opportune times—right as the sale of a company is 
announced for example—where parties are more likely 
to settle so as not to jeopardize a good transaction.”  
Industry-Wide Campaigns 
Another category of demands—“blanket suits”—include 
a large number of targets. In a typical description, a 
company is “sued by an NPE, along with everyone else 
in their industry (biometrics).” Industry-wide suits may 
be staged: one respondent described a strategy in which 
his company was sued 4rst, in order to “negotiate for 
the biggest royalty percentage possible without regard 
to the sales base to which the royalty was applied. 3ey 
then appeared to use the ‘percentage’ settlement in 
negotiations with bigger competitors.”31 Industry-wide 
campaigns may include only letters, or letters and suits. 
References to “crazy insane broad patents” and “so6ware 
patents” were cited in connection with these larger 
campaigns.
Customer or “End-User” Suits 
3e industry-wide campaigns that have generated the 
most numbers of defendants, however, 4t a distinct 
pro4le—that the startup is being sued because of their 
use or implementation of another’s technology, rather 
than the startup’s own technology.32 According to an 
analysis provided by PatentFreedom, which tracks 
NPE litigations, all 10 of the top patent litigation 
campaigns of the last three years, as measured by 
number of defendants, named users or implementers of 
a technology, and over 100 defendants.33  
We asked startups who had received NPE demands to 
identify the basis for the demands they received.  Forty 
          12 New America Foundation
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percent of the respondents (N=35) indicated that the 
basis for the demand was the startup’s adoption of 
another’s technology, a number that was consistent with 
the 2012 survey. 3e technology varied, with survey 
respondents reported being sued, for example, for their 
use of “printer [features]” and “Google Play.” 
Survey respondents also identi4ed the liability startups 
face as suppliers of technology.  Because growing revenue 
and customers is a critical milestone in a new company’s 
development, startups are particularly sensitive to 
disruptions to their customer relationships. As one 
interviewee put it, “[NPEs] also have become adept at 
going a6er the customers of so6ware companies—they 
threaten to sue your customers, who then pressure you 
to settle.” A startup that might otherwise 4ght a demand 
cannot do so when being pressed to pay the NPE by its 
customers.
One prominent campaign, carried out by Lodsys, has 
targeted manufacturers, ecommerce companies, game 
developers, website-survey providers, owners of websites 
with interactive chat, and mobile app developers for 
implementing click-to-upgrade and in-app purchasing, 
through Apple iOS and Android development kits 
and APIs.34  Another campaign, Geotag, has sued an 
estimated 544 defendants for having websites that 
feature locator functionality and organize the results 
geographically.35 3is functionality does not appear 
to be provided by a single provider (both Google and 
Microso6 services, for example, have been implicated) 
but instead implemented by web designers working for 
the defendants and others.
!e Impact of Customer Assertions on Small 
Company Suppliers and Adopters of Technology
To understand the strategy behind and impact of 
customer campaigns on startups in the marketplace, we 
surveyed and interviewed outside and in-house counsel 
and purchasers and customers of technology products. 
Campaigns against customers have impacted startups 
as customers and suppliers in distinct ways. 
As users of others’ technology, startups are less likely 
to be protected from customer suits. Small companies 
are less likely to negotiate the indemnity terms of their 
purchase or have the “buying power” of larger customers 
to demand the protections of technology suppliers than 
are larger companies, interviewees said.
As suppliers, startups face risks when their customers 
are sued.36 Customer suits may be motivated by practical 
obstacles to suing the supplier: either due to the way the 
patent is written, or because the supplier is overseas.37  
However, according to the lawyers we surveyed, the 
motivation is more o6en strategic: for example, to 
enlarge the base—“patentee [did] not sue…  suppliers 
because they have wanted the damages base to be the 
$400/500 price of a phone rather than the $25 price of 
a chip or the price (sometimes zero) of the so6ware,” 
to “maximize the number of defendants to maximize 
the ‘return,’” or “because [trolls]… seek easy money 
from defendants who have no idea how the technology 
works,” said survey respondents.  
Having a customer involved in the suit can change the 
dynamic and make it harder to resist settlement. As one 
venture capitalist said, “we got a nuisance suit from an NPE 
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who actually sued our clients and given the disruption to 
our business we choose to settle rather than pay the expense 
to 4ght… in the… [Eastern District of Texas]. Spending in 
the millions to initially 4ght then settle reduced our hiring 
and development of new products. …[W]ith expenses 
already approaching  $1 million and nervous customers 
we had no choice [but to settle].” 
3e leverage of customers and the threat of suit can 
harm the startup supplier, even if no suit is actually 
4led. As a veteran litigator put it, “small companies 
lose two ways. First, large customers force the suppliers 
into indemni4cation agreements that impose uncapped 
exposure on the supplier for a relatively small amount 
of revenue.  Second, large customers can force suppliers 
to take over a defense and indemni4cation obligations 
even if there is no obligation.  3e small supplier cannot 
a5ord to upset their large customers. As a result, these 
companies can face legal bills (regardless of merits) 
that greatly exceed the revenue that they received from 
selling product to the big customer.”  
Even when the supplier covers its customer’s costs, the 
incident may cause irreparable harm to the relationship: 
according to one VC respondent, “[the NPE suit] cost 
us standing with a large customer who had to deal with 
the same situation. We had indemni4ed, but that wasn’t 
good enough…[given] the lost time, lost con4dence 
and the uncertainty.” At the supplier selection stage, 
the perception that a smaller company may not be 
4nancially able to stand behind its product has also 
impacted purchasing decisions—causing customers to 
drop the technology38  or choose a larger supplier due 
to doubts about the small supplier’s ability to indemnify 
them in the event of loss. One interviewee, legal counsel 
at a large bank, said, “If I have big company on one 
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hand, and small company on the other hand—this is 
real—we’ve gone with the bigger provider because the 
indemnity would wipe… [the small company] out.”  
Low Quality Patents 
Many responses identi4ed low patent quality, speci4cally 
so6ware and business methods patents, as problematic. 
As one startup respondent put it,“[i]n the case of so6ware 
patents, not only is there signi4cant prior art in a large 
percentage of cases, but most so6ware patents are not 
novel: someone had a need to do something, and created 
it. 3at’s how so6ware works. 3ese facts are not helpful 
when faced with an NPE unless you have the resources 
to wage a legal battle to bring the facts to light.” Even if 
seemingly straightforward from a technical standpoint, 
resolving a so6ware patent demand was described 
as “expensive from a legal standpoint.” A common 
sentiment was that “the biggest problem with patents is 
in the so6ware world, where many obvious things are 
patented. 3is makes the whole system weaker.” 
Poor patent quality harms startups and small companies, 
said respondents, when “[l]arge companies use their 
arsenal of patents to 4le frivolous lawsuits,” “[d]eserving 
patents get same timeline as undeserving ones,” and 
“[obvious] [s]o6ware patents hurt innovation and 
destroy jobs,” in the words of respondents.  
But if the problem is that it is “[w]ay too easy to get a 
patent,” what is the solution? A signi4cant minority of 
survey respondents mentioned abolishing so6ware or 
business method patents or shortening the so6ware 
patent life to re7ect the innovation cycle.  Several other 
responses endorsed doing so if the “problem of frivolous 
litigation” could not be resolved.
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But these proposals, which would dramatically change 
the current patent system,39  had as many and, in some 
cases, more detractors than supporters among survey-
takers. For example, abolishing so6ware patents was 
strongly favored by about 13% of surveyed VCs but 
disfavored by 38% of them (N=87). While opinions 
were nearly evenly split on the question of whether to 
shorten patent term, nearly 70% favored or strongly 
favored limiting so6ware to truly novel inventions (Fig. 
2).  
Finding 2. Although patent “troll” assertions 
are perceived as motivated primarily by money, 
respondents reported routinely experiencing 
non-"nancial consequences including delays 
in hiring, meeting milestones, and business 
line pivots and exits.
In this survey, we directly asked venture capitalists and 
startups to describe the impacts on their companies 
when they received NPE assertions. We compared these 
results with the 4ndings of Chien 2012,40 which also asked 
survey participants about NPE impacts (Fig. 3). 3e level 
of agreement varied by the type of impact. However, 
across them, a signi4cant portion of respondents—close 
to 50% in each group—reported at least one signi4cant 
operational impact from the assertions: a delay in hiring 
or other milestone, change in product, business pivot, 
exit, or loss of customers or revenue (Fig. 3).
Perception of Unbounded Risk
While starting and running a company carries many 
di5erent risks, patent demands compare unfavorably to 
others, according to respondents. A typical sentiment 
described dealing with a demand as a “very worrying, 
stressful and soul destroying process.”  Part of the problem 
is that the exposure is not known to the parties up front. 
One interviewee, an entrepreneur who has encountered 
multiple demands from NPEs, said, “You feel like you 
missed something. 3e risks feel unbounded. You could 
lose the company. You just don’t know.” Said a founder, 
“[p]atents are one of the most painful parts of running a 
startup, and that’s saying something.”  
Impacts Flow from Costs of Defense, Not Loss 
on the Merits of a Patent Case
3e impacts of patent assertion are o6en experienced 
regardless of whether or not the startup ultimately 
prevails on the merits. Patent law is hard, requiring 
founders and others at a company that gets a demand 
to spend time and energy 4nding counsel and getting 
          16 New America Foundation
“[O]ne company that is not entirely out of business, but is a tiny shell of its former self as a resultof being subjected to 
two patent suits in rapid succession by two di!erent entities, neither of which would "t the de"nition of an NPE or a PAE. 
Both were failed entrants. Both were failed start-ups. The company was in the business of providing advertising services 
to major brands. The "rst suit that we were hit with was from a company that was not in the business of advertising 
services at all. It was a business-to-business company that was providing software, not services, to a completely di!erent 
industry—law enforcement. There’s no way we could have searched for that patent.
“The second suit we were hit with also was so completely di!erent than what we were doing. That hurt when they sued 
us. But it didn’t have a huge e!ect. They hadn’t gotten an injunction.
“But then they went on to sue our customers. So these are people like American Express and American Airlines, and 
General Motors. The company in question employed 70 people. We were doing about $10 million in annual revenue, and 
when they sued our customers, this was a nice to have, not a need to have, it was a marketing program for the customers. 
The suits cut our revenue in half in three months. And so we couldn’t sustain the 70 people that we had on the payroll, 
and so we had to cut the company in half.”
-Brad Burnham, Union Square Ventures 
For full testimony, see Appendix B.
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up to speed on the complex, technical, and intricate set 
of procedures and options available at the patent o8ce 
and in patent courts. Considerable engineer time is 
required, for example, to 4le for patents and conduct 
depositions. Patent law is also expensive.  According 
to one account, the company knew “within 24 hours 
of being sued” that it was not infringing.  However, it 
incurred $3M in litigation expenses before the suit was 
dismissed.41  Based on disclosures the company made 
during litigation, the patentee 4led for and got new 
claims issued that it used to sue the company again. Even 
though it had won the 4rst suit, the company decided to 
settle the claim rather than endure another lawsuit, by 
paying the NPE “in the low seven 4gures.” 3e company 
was acquired in the interim, and the acquirer reduced 
the value of the company by 20% due to the suit.42  
Impacts on Customer Relations, Transactions, 
and Operations 
As described earlier, customer relations present 
particular vulnerabilities for small companies, as do 
times of fundraising or acquisition. With respect to the 
latter, several interviewees and respondents described 
the friction in the market that the heightened risk 
of patent lawsuits has created.  In the words of one 
interviewee: 
[B]ecause acquisitions o6en trigger IP lawsuits 
from trolls (e.g., Oracle buys company X, so trolls 
immediately sue Oracle who has lots of money, 
claiming that company X’s product infringes 
on their patent), acquirers are now putting huge 
indemni4cations in the deals, up to the size of 
the whole deal in several cases we have seen. 3at 
means that the full value of the deal paid to the 
shareholders of Company X may have to be paid 
back if Oracle gets sued.
Or as another respondent put it, the motive of a suit may be 
that the “[p]atent troll [is] seeking to steal escrow money 
post acquisition of [a] portfolio company,” seeming to 
suggest that the availability of the escrow money makes 
an acquired company more vulnerable to attack.
“Imagine you’re a small startup business. You have 
three employees, including yourself, and you make 
about $500K per year in revenue. You get a patent 
infringement letter and are referred to some patent 
attorney who tells you they charge $500 an hour and 
will take at least 40 to 60 hours to review the matter. 
Then, if you want this attorney to respond to the patent 
holder, that’s another 20 hours to write letters, do 
conference calls, etc. Before you know it, you’ve spent 
$50K and had to lay o! one of your employees. All this 
time the patent holder is o!ering to settle for $20 to 
40K. What are you going to do?”
-Dan Ravicher, Executive Director of Public 
Patent Foundation 
For full testimony, see Appendix B.
Even when these conditions are not present, the demands 
of a patent lawsuit have the potential to fundamentally 
alter a company’s trajectory. As an interviewee noted, 
“one of the companies we are invested in was sued by a 
NPE.  3e company employs 170 people, many in high 
paid manufacturing jobs. 3e company develops and 
sells novel therapeutic medical devices to treat patients 
in pain.  3e suit by the NPE will result in the company 
changing its hiring and commercialization plans to 
deal with the suit,” or worse “[the current suit] may put 
company out of business. Litigation is too expensive for 
such a small company.”
Finding 3. According to survey responses, most 
VCs, particularly from pharma, biotech, and 
medical device industries, believe patents to 
be important to innovation and an estimated 
5% of startups have sold their patents to NPEs, 
experiencing positive bene"ts from doing so. 
However, most VC respondents, including 
the small number whose companies have sold 
to NPEs, believe that NPEs are harmful for 
innovation.
!e Positive Impacts of NPEs for Some Startups
3e perceived negative impacts of patent assertions 
cannot be viewed in isolation from their potentially 
positive impacts. Trolls can bene4t startups by providing 
a path to liquidity and enabling further investment and 
innovation.  As litigation becomes more expensive, this 
path has become increasingly challenging. As one of 
VC survey respondents described,  “patent enforcement 
has become 4nancially undoable for small startup 
companies. NPEs provide an avenue to protect assets 
that would otherwise be lost due to 4nancial constraints.” 
While positive media accounts are relatively rare, it does 
not mean that NPEs do not produce any bene4ts.
Based on survey responses, an estimated 5% of startups 
are monetizing their patents. Sales can have signi4cant 
positive impacts for companies that sell as the cash 
infusion brings more resources into the company.44 A 
handful of VC respondents and company respondents 
provided information about how the proceeds of patent 
monetization were shared with them. According to the 
10 responses, 60% were compensated through a lump-
sum payment, and the remainder received a share of 
the proceeds ranging from 10% to 67%, sometimes in 
combination with an upfront payment. 
3is money can be used to create signi4cant value 
for the startup. According to VC responses, startup 
patent monetizers using the money acquired through 
NPEs have been able   to fund a business pivot (37%), 
pay for new hiring (20%), and help the company meet 
milestones (17%). (N=30)   As one VC respondent said, 
the “company would have died without it—instead 
we grew.” One startup founder described the bene4t 
as enabling the company to protect against the6 by 
competitors: “NPEs allow us to take on infringers who 
steal our work.” If a company initiates a patent lawsuit, it 
risks a countersuit and harm to its reputation. However, 
by selling the patent to an NPE, the company can reap 
the bene4ts without the risk. Because the NPE does not 
make products, it is invulnerable to countersuit and 
other potential consequences of initiating suit.
Given the positive impacts associated with patent 
monetization, why aren’t more companies doing it? 
3ose who didn’t sell as well as those who did provided 
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some answers. A number of respondents cited moral 
opposition to patenting and patent assertion:  “workforce 
philosophically opposed [to patents],” “that’s against our 
business ethic,” “most startups are not eager to work 
with patent trolls.” Others saw NPE monetization as a 
last resort: it was a “last ditch measure of desperation” 
or done as part of “liquidation”; one VC interviewee 
said that a seller, from a company in his portfolio, later 
“regretted it.”45  
Some respondents stressed that the NPE and startup 
business model were at cross-purposes: “we are in 
the business of developing products not monetizing 
patents.” “[s]tartups are about execution;” “[w]e make 
money solving real world problems.” “I believe in 
competition” was one startup executive’s answer to the 
question “[i]f your company doesn’t have patents, please 
indicate why.” But practical obstacles also exist: startups 
have new patents, but NPEs disproportionately assert 
old patents that cover mature existing technologies.46 
Many startups do not have patents, due to the cost and 
long gestation, relative to product lifecycles47  although 
VC respondents to this survey reported a high level of 
patenting among their companies (70%).48  Growing, 
successful young companies o6en need their patents for 
defensive and signaling purposes and can’t a5ord to sell 
them to a NPE, or can not a5ord the time or distraction 
from the main business to engage in licensing campaigns. 
VC Opinions about the Impacts of Patents and 
Patent Assertion on Innovation
3e focus of policy discussions should be the social 
calculus of patent assertion. According to some 
estimates, the private and social costs of dealing with 
NPE demands are in the tens of billions of dollars per 
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year,50  based on extrapolating from survey data, though 
the representativeness of the data points of those costs 
which should properly be classi4ed as transfers to 
innovators is unknown.51 If most of the money from 
patent assertion is going from large companies to small 
innovative ones, even with a high transaction cost, 
society might bene4t through enhanced competition.
VCs are well-poised to understand these 7ows as both 
sources and users of technology. To understand how VCs 
viewed the impacts of patent assertion on innovation, 
we provided a separate module to about 73 VC survey-
takers (about half of the surveyed population) who 
invest in a variety of technology companies spanning 
biotech to app development. 3e survey asked how 
much survey-takers agreed or disagreed with three 
assertions (Fig. 4):
1. 3e ability of my companies to enforce or 
monetize their patents through NPEs/“trolls” 
helps innovation.
2. Patents are vital for innovation in my industry.
3. 3e ability of my companies to enforce or 
monetize their patents through NPEs/”trolls” 
helps innovation.
!e Positive Role of Patents
Out of 41 respondents, 71% agreed or strongly agreed 
that patents were vital for innovation in their industry 
(Fig. 4). While the number of total respondents was too 
few to break into industry cohorts, many of the positive 
comments came from the biotech, pharma, and medical 
device industries. Survey respondents reported, for 
example, that patents were “critical for raising money 
for product development,” and “crucial for protecting 
the expensive innovations and product development 
investments that must be made to bring a novel e5ective 
product through the regulatory process.” One investor 
described how “the company achieved a signi4cant 
increase in acquisition price as a result of their patent 
portfolio.” Another VC commented that patents were a 
necessity, enabling investment: “[it is] impossible to get 
4nancing without a good patent strategy, freedom to 
operate and good prospects of patentability.”
Answers to a related question may partially explain 
the response: VCs reported that their companies were 
engaged with the patent system in multiple ways, 
through patent 4lings,52  licensing in the patents of 
others to access technology,53  and licensing out of their 
own patents to transfer technology.54  
While most surveyed VCs were positive about patents, 
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“One suit hit the company at a very vulnerable time and almost put it out of business. The company learned a lot from 
these experiences and turned around and started licensing to NPEs. The "rst time they did it, they needed the money.
“But then—this is going to sound like prostitution—they realized this was an opportunity to bring more resources into 
the company... Since the "rst sale, they have periodically looked at their portfolio, and sold groups of patents to di!erent 
litigation entities. Another lawsuit the company had was actually from a NPE that acquired a patent from another one of 
our portfolio companies. I learned this while in the due diligence process while investing in the company that sold. The 
person who sold that patent recently told me he regrets selling it, and the company has made a point of not pursuing 
any additional patent licensing.
“Net-net, I wish we had never been on either o!ense or defense. I think the company would have been better o! had 
it never been sued for infringement and never sold patents. In fact, the bene"t of selling patents—their own use of the 
system—didn’t o!set the pain of the lawsuits.”
-Don Ellson, Private Equity Investor 
For full testimony, see Appendix B.
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startup survey respondents55 tended to express more 
anti-patent sentiments, e.g. “abolish so6ware patents” 
or “business method patents should not be allowed.”  Yet 
even among VCs who valued patents, their impressions 
of the patent system were negatively colored by their 
NPE experiences: 
I am pro-patent, very pro-patent… because I think 
in the long-run it helps with innovation in the 
industry.  I think people who innovate deserve to 
be rewarded.  However, if the alternative is having 
a bunch of NPEs running around increasing the 
cost of doing business through frivolous lawsuits 
then I think this country would be better o5 
abolishing so6ware patents.
!e Negative Role of Patent Assertion Entities
A mixed view was shared by many VC respondents; 
a majority of responders viewed patents favorably, 
but patent assertion negatively: 78% of respondents 
disagreed strongly that the ability of companies to 
monetize their patents through NPEs/“trolls” helped 
innovation, and 83% agreed or agreed strongly that 
NPEs/“trolls” were hurting innovation (Fig. 4). 
While a number of remarks expressed only negative 
sentiments about NPEs,56 a number of them openly 
addressed the di5erence between patents helping 
companies defensively and NPEs asserting them 
o5ensively: 
Patents are important… Having a decent portfolio 
allows our companies to build ‘stakes’ around 
their solution and make it more di8cult for a 
competitor to replicate the solution without 
signi4cant work. Trolls, being NPEs are using 
patents only to monetize, but not create any value 
as our companies are, so I do see them as being 
misaligned with how our companies use patents 
as a defensive (rather than o5ensive) measure in 
most cases.
3e sense that NPEs did not “4ght fair” or contribute 
to society, even though patents were valuable, pervaded 
related answers to the question, “Please describe 
any experiences that you would like to share with 
lawmakers regarding the positive or negative impact of 
patents/patent enforcement on your investments and 
your companies. How have patents helped or harmed 
transacting and innovation in your industry?” 
NPEs negatively colored otherwise positive views of 
patents. As one respondent relayed: “patents held by 
legitimate product companies are important to support 
investment and innovation. NPE’s activities should be 
severely limited - they are not net contributors to society 
and their contribution to exits is not signi4cant.” In the 
view of another, an investor in advanced manufacturing 
and industrial technologies who indicated that his 
portfolio companies had sold patents to NPEs: 
All of our portfolio companies 4le patents; have had 
patents issued and are continuing to innovate and 
consult with their IP Committees about ongoing 
4ling of novel ideas/products. We have been the 
defendants in three lawsuits by… patent trolls. One 
of the three… cost our company greatly in the cost 
of capital—the suit was 4led in the midst of a capital 
raise—as well as the cost to settle the case.
One VC respondent weighed the pros and cons this way: 
[P]atents slightly help: increas[ing] chances 
investors will back your company (‘you have 
something unique and protectable’).  But mostly 
investors don’t care because it is hard for startups to 
enforce patents, and there are usually ways to work 
around them. [3ey] o6en hurt: the patents out 
there represent a mine-4eld for a small company.  
[It is] expensive to know that you are in the clear, 
[and there is a] chance of highway robbery by NPEs.  
Net-net, they are probably a negative these days.
!e Views of !ose Who Have Bene"ted From 
and Been Harmed by NPEs 
3ose who have sold their patents have more direct 
experience with the positive impacts of those sales. A 
small number of the VCs (N=12) who provided their 
views on innovation also indicated that their companies 
had monetized their patents. Despite their likely 
familiarity with the positive impacts of assertions, these 
VCs had highly negative views of patent “trolls”:  83% 
strongly disagreed that “the ability of my companies to 
enforce or monetize their patents through NPEs/‘trolls’ 
helps innovation”; 67% agreed or strongly agreed that 
patents were vital for innovation and 58% strongly 
agreed that NPEs hurt innovation. 
3is surprising outcome may be explained by the 
likelihood that, based on responses, portfolios of 
surveyed VCs whose companies had monetized through 
NPEs (5%) likely also included companies that had 
received demands by NPEs (20% of companies). How 
did VCs whose companies had both sold patents to 
NPEs and been sued by NPEs trade o5 the advantages 
or disadvantages?
Several venture capitalists described cross-portfolio 
attacks in which companies in their portfolio had 
actually been sued on the basis of a patent that another 
company in their portfolio had previously sold. In one 
case, the patents were sold when the 4rst portfolio 
company needed cash. Later the patents resurfaced in 
a NPE lawsuit against a second portfolio company. 3e 
company that had sold also was sued multiple times by 
NPEs, leading the venture capitalist to conclude: “3e 
bene4t of selling patents—their own use of the system—
didn’t o5set the pain of the lawsuits, particularly when 
they came… I’d rather there be no patents than the 
current system.”57   
In the case of another investor, a patent was sold in 
the company 4resale. It eventually found its way into 
the hands of, not an NPE, but a large incumbent who 
turned around and asserted it against the investor’s new 
portfolio: “IP that was partially funded by our 4rm was 
used to sue other portfolio companies… and it is one 
of the many reasons why I have come to believe that 
so6ware and business method patents are an enemy of 
innovation.”58 
A more cynical account was provided by another VC 
whose companies had sold to NPEs as well as been 
targeted by them: 
NPEs have no positive impact on innovation. Real 
innovators don’t work long years in order to sell 
out to an NPE. 3ey are motivated by the hope that 
they can build an operating business and change 
the world. NPEs come along like a loan shark a6er 
a mass layo5 and buy broken dreams for cheap.
Finding 4. Startup concerns with patent 
enforcement go beyond NPEs and extend to the 
disadvantages relative to larger incumbents that 
startups experience as a result of poor patent 
quality, high costs, and delays associated with 
the patent system. !e inability of startups to 
defend their own patents, and suits brought by 
“patent predators,” larger companies that sue 
with anti-competitive motives, also presented 
speci"c concerns.
Although the focus of this report is on patent assertions 
by NPEs, a number of questions on the survey addressed 
other topics about the patent system, including patent 
litigation against competitors, the relative position of 
large and small companies in the patent system, and the 
administration of the patent system. Previous work has 
found that delayed venture capital funding characterizes 
so6ware sectors where incumbents hold large numbers 
of patents.59  Among answers to this survey there was a 
common theme: that small companies are disadvantaged 
by the costs and delays associated with the patent system 
because the patent “game” is one that is “too slow” and 
“too expensive to play for small companies.” 
Survey respondents described what they felt were 
disadvantages for small companies across the patent 
system: in prosecution, “big companies can 4le huge 
volume of patents [and] need to have a higher hurdle for 
patentability;” on the defense, “[t]he power of companies 
with a lot of assets to sue and harass smaller companies 
for whom 4ghting is 4nancially di8cult is unfairly 
detrimental to innovation and new businesses;” and on 
the o5ense, when “[l]arge companies largely tell their 
executives to build whatever product that the markets 
needs and not to worry about smaller companies’ patents 
because they will be able to outlast them in court.”  
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Across these contexts and comments, VC and company 
respondents consistently expressed the general 
sentiment that “[a large company] can outlast and 
outspend a smaller company.” 
Missing the Forest for the Trolls60 
A number of VCs expressed the sense that the patent 
advantages of incumbents were as great, if not  greater, 
a problem for startups than patent “trolls.” According to 
one respondent: 
IP is not black/white and you cannot simply group 
us into companies who pursue patents and those 
who do not. Small companies who 4le a small 
number of patents are still outgunned by the bigger 
corps who can 4le (or buy/license) more patents 
and have deeper pockets with which to 4ght 
battles. 3is goes beyond the equally important 
problem with NPEs… 
Others went further, viewing NPEs as a distraction from 
the real problem of large companies misusing their power: 
Patents are critical for innovation in small 
companies and small companies are critical for 
job creation in our country.  We should be much 
more worried about big companies misusing the 
patent system against small companies rather than 
fretting about patent trolls using the patent system 
against big companies. 3e big company lobby 
is the consistent ‘winner’ in this battle and it is 
hurting our country.
Advantages of Incumbents in Patent Defense
Survey respondents described abuses by large 
companies in both resisting and bringing demands. In 
the words of one VC, “[b]ig companies don’t take small 
companies seriously because they know we don’t have 
the resources to start infringement litigation.” A number 
of comments referred to not just ignorance but the6 by 
larger companies, enabled by a slow and cumbersome 
patent administration system: “I have one company 
now that developed technology which was described as 
impossible by large competitors. We have issued patents 
but now that this technology is winning in the market, 
those same competitors freely copy it and say that what 
we did was obvious. Defending our patents takes years 
and is very expensive. When we 4nally win they will 
claim that competition is good for the US economy.” 
Advantages, Tactics, and Motivations of 
Incumbents in Patent O#ense
A large number of comments also addressed the o5ensive 
advantages of large companies when they sue small 
companies, also known as patent predation61  or patent 
bullying,62  and their apparently anti-competitive motives.
In response to the question, “what triggered the suit/
demand,”63 a few VCs responded that the suit was an 
overture to an acquisition or licensing (“[p]atentee’s 
strategy was to force a merger (competitor)”; “in some 
cases, work out a licensing agreement”) or to interfere 
with the startup’s operations (“[b]ig company scorched 
earth tactics … scare a smaller company and make it 
hard to raise funding”). In extreme cases, to sue a 
company out of existence appeared to be the object 
of the suit, according to VC respondents: “drain the 
start-up of cash to remove a competitor”; “to squash 
a thinly funded competitor”; “competitor’s desire to 
shut company down.” 3e posture of cases was not 
necessarily o5ensive, however, as VCs also cited the 
defensive concerns of incumbents fearful of the startup’s 
success when asked what triggered the suit or demand: 
to “thwart company’s market share growth or stall 
market traction of new technology,” “competitor does 
not have this technology but much larger and deeper 
pockets”; “emerging threat of startup to incumbents”; 
“[c]ompetitor usually gets scared and usually has no 
real claim but tries to tie small company up. Competitor 
is usually very large public corp.” Company respondents 
put it more plainly: “[c]ompetitor is losing and is 
resorting to spurious business method patents”; “[there] 
was no basis for [the competitor suit], but their company 
was going bankrupt so it was probably desperation.”
“Competitor” v. “NPE”
In many of these cases, the distinction between a large 
company competitor and “troll” was unclear—“the 
di5erence between NPE and competitor is gray. 3e 
competitors were at one point trying to launch a product 
but clearly never acquired the resources to do so. So they 
e5ectively became NPEs” said one VC. Another VC and 
his portfolio company discussed in survey responses 
and follow up correspondence that: 
[S]ome operating companies are ‘sham companies’ 
that acquire defunct or non-functioning 
companies for cents on the dollar and uses those 
patents to attack large and small companies alike 
or sell a minimal amount to establish some shred 
of legitimacy. 3ey go a6er start-up companies to 
establish case precedent.
While labels were unhelpful to these commenters, what 
did seem to matter was whether not the company was 
actually developing or selling a product.  Was the patent 
being “used” appeared to be the yardstick, though this 
is not a requirement of patent ownership or assertion: 
“[p]atents that are legitimate serve a useful purpose 
when owned and used by an operating company. A 
company should only be able to prosecute a patent if 
it has a commercial product that relies on that patent 
or is in active development of one,” said one VC 
survey respondent.  Another agreed: “[p]atents held by 
legitimate product companies are important to support 
investment and innovation. NPEs activities should 
be severely limited—they are not net contributors to 
society and their contribution to exits is not signi4cant.”
3is distinction is translated into attitudes about the 
ultimate social value of patent lawsuits. In one VC’s 
opinion, “[i]ts very clear that competitor demands 
are positive and sharpen the company strategy, 
troll demands are much more detrimental - pure 
extortion.” But others thought competitor cases were 
more challenging: “corporate enforcement actions 
are o6en more complex and demanding than NPE’s 
because corporate actions are motivated by more than 
monetization, and o6en emotion drives litigation 
decisions. NPEs rarely have these issues.” But according 
to another, “[w]ith competitors you have a business 
discussion. With an NPE, you are speaking with 
federally-endorsed organized crime.”
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“We were planning to raise a Series A round during the summer of 2013 but before we could, we were sued for patent 
infringement by our biggest competitor, Wellpoint, who owns 1-800-Contacts and Glasses.com. Just like that, we were 
faced with an ‘injunction’ threat from a $25B competitor. I was terri"ed our years of hard work were for naught.
“As it turns out, after seeing our technology, Wellpoint launched its own o!ering and immediately bought a patent which 
they are now using to sue us. It took me some time to come to grips with that fact that a $25B healthcare  company who 
carefully crafts the image of being compassionate and caring towards the consumer would go on the aggressive against 
a 13-person startup. I can only speculate that they fear that the patents we "led (which take years to issue!) will become a 
weapon towards them down the road. But if they would have just called me before "ling a lawsuit against us, they would 
know we applied for those patents for defensive purposes, not o!ensive ones. I care more about building a superior 
customer experience than I do about going after them with patents.”
-Kate Endress, Founder and CEO of DITTO.com 
For full testimony, see Appendix B.
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Proposals and Observations
 The second part of this report describes existing and potential legislative, judicial, and market-
based responses to patent assertions and how they may be tailored to better meet the needs of startups 
and resource-poor defendants. According to survey responses, patents for novel inventions appear to 
be playing a generally positive and at times crucial role for startups, helping to transfer technology, en-
able investment, and improve exits, particularly in life sciences industries. But patent assertions at times 
hit startups when they are least able to "ght them—on the eve of a funding or acquisition event, or, 
40% of the time, in the context of its customer relations—and can have signi"cant and at times devas-
tating impacts on the company.  Furthermore, many survey respondents don’t "nd these to be socially 
productive assertions—but rather involving frivolous or overbroad patents, and frustrating rather than 
furthering competition.
 Among the surveyed VCs, NPE experiences were both common, with nearly 90% of tech VCs 
reporting experience with NPE assertions, and also highly concerning: two-thirds of VC respondents 
strongly agreed with the assertion that NPEs/”trolls” were harming innovation in their industry, a senti-
ment shared even by those who monetized their patents.  Though “the risk [associated with patents] 
feels unbounded,” startups are routinely expected to absorb these risks in their dealings with acquirers, 
investors, and customers. As detailed in the comments and testimony, NPE assertions have added fric-
tion to technology transactions, reduced the value of pursued startups, and triggered large indemnities 
among the surveyed population.  
 Taken together, these responses make a strong case for patent reforms, but reforms that will 
work for startups and small companies and their distinct needs and vulnerabilities.  Startups, with their 
fewer resources, less time, and greater focus on building the business, are at a relative disadvantage 
when patent processes are expensive, slow, and require deep patent expertise. These disadvantages 
make startups vulnerable to patent “bullies”—incumbents who are threatened by the success of up-
starts, as well as “trolls” who bring patent nuisance claims. 
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3ese 4ndings have implications both for public actors 
who seek to improve the patent system and private 
actors who seek to reduce the business risks that patent 
assertions pose. 3e ideas discussed below reinforce 
existing and proposed e5orts and suggest others for 
improving our patent system. To the extent possible, the 
recommendations leverage existing laws, programs, and 
initiatives, making them more tailored to the needs of 
startups and small companies, rather than creating new 
private causes of action, new regulatory infrastructure, 
or onerous compliance burdens for the PTO or courts.
PUBLIC SECTOR PROPOSALS
Recommendation 1: “Make patents on so$ware 
only for truly innovative things.”
How: Fully fund the PTO and its quality initiatives 
including tightening functional claiming and expand 
low-cost access to the PTO’s transitional program and 
other forms of post-grant review by reducing fees for 
small and micro entities and supporting and prioritizing 
collaborative challenges to patents asserted against large 
numbers of defendants, particularly by downstream 
users and small entities.
Overbroad and low-quality patents are responsible 
for a disproportionate amount of the discontent 
in the patent system, according to VC and startup 
respondents. To address the perception that bad patents 
are creating unmanageable patent risk, lawmakers and 
administrators should: 
1. Fully fund, adequately sta#, and support the 
PTO in current and future initiatives to increase 
patent quality.
3e earlier its lifecycle that a low-quality patent can 
be weeded out, the less it will cost to society. 3us, the 
PTO must be empowered  to act as a true gatekeeper 
and guardian of the public by preventing the patenting 
of non-novel inventions. Assuming that this will require 
a change to how the PTO is currently doing business, 
however, support will be needed on several fronts.
First, the PTO must be fully funded, adequately sta5ed, 
and supported in its current and future patent quality 
initiatives. 3ese programs include training, guideline 
development, prior art partnerships for example with 
Stack Exchange, its So6ware Patent partnership, and 
basic infrastructure improvements. Because of their 
high social return on investment, these sorts of initiatives 
should be prioritized. Second, and crucially,  institutional 
pressures must not undermine improvement of patent 
quality. Examiners who reject large numbers of patent 
applications should not be penalized for doing so.64 3e 
PTO must be able to rigorously apply the law without 
jeopardizing its 4nancial outlook. A more gradual 
process of ratcheting up the standards for granting a 
patent would give patentees and prosecutors the ability 
to write higher quality patent applications of narrower 
and more de4ned scope. 3e PTO should focus on 
quality levers like obviousness, functional claiming,65 
and the other disclosure doctrines, and apply them 
rigorously, transparently, and consistently.
As the PTO executes, for example, on President 
Obama’s mandate to provide new training to examiners 
on functional claiming and provide claim clarity,66 it 
should have support to do what is necessary to apply the 
law, including educating patent prosecutors, phasing in 
guidelines, and adjusting count and incentive systems.67 
3e PTO should engage the public through its So6ware 
Partnership and make it easy to track its progress and 
get involved at a patent level.
2. Increase low-cost access to the PTO’s 
administrative review processes, including by 
giving special priority to “high-impact” patents 
that have been asserted against a large number 
of targets. 
Improvements in patent quality need to translate into 
reduced risk and cost, which can be in the millions when 
startups defend a case.68 3us, although improving the 
quality of patent applications is important, already 
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“[O]ne of the most critical problems is the issuance of so many invalid patents by the Patent O#ce. The PTO makes 
ten times as much money from granting patents as it does from denying patents, and examiners have a much easier 
time making their quota by granting patents, because no one objects, than from rejecting a patent and defending that 
rejection repeatedly. Until the incentives placed on the o#ce and its employees to grant, rather than deny, patents 
are addressed, there will be too many invalid patents issued that can be strategically used by their holders to extract 
undeserved settlements from others.”
-Dan Ravicher, Executive Director of Public Patent Foundation 
For full testimony, see Appendix B.
issued patents are an equally urgent target of patent 
quality initiatives.
3e America Invents Act has created promising 
mechanisms for challenging questionable patents, but 
there are limits to their usefulness for startups and small 
companies. 3e inter partes review (IPR) and the covered 
business method (CBM) review mechanisms are being 
used to a much greater extent than previous forms of 
post grant review.69  3e initiation of such reviews can be 
e5ective for slowing patent demands.  For example, in the 
case of the scanner patent assertion entity MPHJ, the entity 
quieted its campaign following a licensing agreement and 
the initiation of two inter partes reviews on its patents. 
However, two features signi4cantly limit the usefulness 
of these mechanisms for startups and small companies: 
cost and scope of review.  First, IPR and CBM are 
expensive and increase upfront costs—estimates of 
IPR costs range from $200-300K and CBMs have 
been priced at $350K. For example, to 4le an inter 
partes review (IPR) typically requires, according to 
a seasoned litigator, “a prior art search, detailed 4ling 
(akin to a summary judgment brief), and, typically, an 
accompanying expert declaration… 3e large upfront 
cost (e.g., $75,000)  discourages small companies from 
4ling an IPR [which] is more expensive in the short 
term.” 3ese costs will not be o5set if any accompanying 
litigation is not stayed.70  Second, not all procedures are 
available for all patents on all grounds. For example, the 
CBM program is limited to business method patents. 
However, CBM is currently the only post-grant review 
mechanism that allows challenges to be brought to 
existing patents on the basis of overbroad functional 
claiming (Section 112) and related grounds of invalidity.
Low-cost access to administrative review of a patent 
should be expanded. Small and micro entity fee tiers 
should be available, and the PTO should support 
collaborative challenges to empower multiple small 
parties to take advantage of administrative review. 3e 
courts should prioritize those reviews to ensure that they 
translate into lower costs through stays or limitations on 
willfulness.  
3e PTO could also be given authority to prioritize 
reviews on the basis of public interest, in the same way 
that it prioritizes the review of patent applications that, 
for example, cover energy conservation or counter-
terrorism inventions.71   In the case of patent challenges, 
special treatment could be reserved for patents that 
are “high impact” because they are asserted, through 
letters or suit, against a large number of entities or more 
(e.g. 20 though the right number should be empirically 
derived), or because they are asserted against a certain 
number of small entities that have, for example, fewer 
than 500 employees or nonpro4t status. 3is would 
likely encompass “en masse” campaigns that have 
been asserted against large numbers of customers72 or 
campaigns that otherwise “blanket the industry.” Such 
treatment would recognize that not all patent campaigns 
are created equal. When a dispute impacts a large number 
of members of the public, or disproportionately impacts 
small entities, the social returns from clari4cation of the 
claim scope and patent’s validity are high. 
3ese gains would be realized whether the patent is 
con4rmed, invalidated, or clari4ed. Rather than 4ghting 
over the patent’s validity in court, the parties could 
move on and settle the case or focus the dispute. For 
these types of patents, all grounds of review could be 
available, and review could be provided on an expedited 
basis upon petition, as that review arguably impacts 
more people than an ordinary review.  3e PTO could 
also accept “petitions to review” from members of the 
public and initiate its own post-grant review if it feels 
like the public interest would be served.
In addition, the PTO should continue its excellent job 
thus far of bolstering con4dence that its reviews are 
being handled in a timely manner. It should make the 
status of administrative proceedings transparent and 
accessible so a court feels con4dent that when it stays 
a case and waits for the PTO’s review, it will not be 
delaying justice inde4nitely. 3e PTO should publish 
target dates for the completion of its proceedings, as 
does the International Trade Commission (ITC), whose 
“investigations” proceed in parallel with district court 
cases. 
Recommendation 2: Make patent cases about 
merits, not about who can “play the patent game 
better…[or] outlast or outspend.” 
How: Permit more discretion in awarding fees and costs 
for non-core discovery and promoting uniformity and 
early dispositive rulings, for example by requiring the 
Patent Pilot Program to implement and measure the 
impact of best practices.
If it is the case that “[e]xpensive, bureaucratic systems 
always favor those with deep pockets”, three steps can 
reduce the costs and risks for small company patent 
plainti5s and defendants.
1. Promote fee-shi$ing and discovery cost-
shi$ing.
A number of comments re7ect the perception that 
plainti5s bring weak patent cases in part because they 
will not be penalized for doing so: “the legal costs to 
running a business are signi4cant. 3ere is no penalty 
for suing a company even if the claims are completely 
fraudulent. 3erefore, there is nothing to lose from 
suing any company that you think has money.”
Fee-shi6ing would change this dynamic when the party 
with fewer resources has the stronger case: “[we] got a 
nuisance suit…we chose to settle rather than pay the 
expense to 4ght. [I]f we knew we’d get our expenses 
back if we won the suit, we would have continued”; 
“[e]ven if clearly not infringing, small companies 
(start-ups) are wasting time and capital defending or 
settling frivolous suits due to the way our legal system 
works (both sides pay for legal fees, so [it’s] cheaper to 
settle than 4ght even if you know you’ll likely win).” 
Commented one founder and CEO who tried to raise 
money from investors to ward o5 a patent suit, “the fact 
that fees are o6en sunk costs (no fee-shi6ing in place 
yet) also made it harder to raise money for this.”73 As 
discussed earlier, fee-shi6ing could also encourage 
small companies, despite their shallower pockets, 
to bring strong cases against larger competitors by 
penalizing the large company for resisting a meritorious 
demand. Fee-shi6ing is not a panacea, however—it 
has been the norm for centuries in other settings but 
its ability to deter frivolous litigation has not been 
well-documented.74  In the context of patent litigation, 
indeterminacy in patent determinations and appeals, as 
well as the ability of parties to evade judgment without a 
bond requirement, present real obstacles to the recovery 
process. Still, two-way fee-shi6ing will increase the 
penalty for asserting weak claims, as well as the penalty 
for  resisting meritorious claims, and empower those 
with strong cases to pursue them.
Courts should use existing and any expanded discretion 
they are given to shi6 fees in order to discourage wasteful 
litigation and litigation practices.  Congress should 
also enable courts to shi6 fees prior to the resolution 
of a case as few small companies have the ability to “go 
all the way” in litigation.  Requiring parties to pay for 
discovery beyond core documents, as has been proposed 
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by a number of Congressional bills, would reduce the 
staggering costs and ine8ciencies that can accompany 
conventional patent litigation.
2. Promote Greater Uniformity Across Patent 
Courts.
Another recurring theme among the comments was 
the problem of game-playing, particularly through 
venue-shopping. Commenters speci4cally called out 
particular venues. In one example, a VC respondent 
described his companies as being sued by three patent 
“trolls,” including one “4led in [the] Eastern District of 
Texas with Judge Ward  [that] cost our company greatly 
in the cost of capital [and settlement]—a seven 4gure 
amount. 3e settlement was only agreed to once Judge 
Ward agreed to a change of venue to a court in Ohio. 
3is whole ‘gaming strategy’ deployed by these trolls is 
quite disruptive and costly to early stage companies. I 
am a big supporter of restricting the unbridled activities 
of these patent trolls.” A number of others talked about 
the additional costs of being sued in venues that were 
inconvenient to them.75 
Wide variations in how courts managed patent cases 
were also described in companion surveys of over 
500 in-house and outside patent counsel.76  “I still see 
a huge disparity among the courts’ e-discovery rules 
and standards,” said one plainti5 ’s attorney. Asked to 
comment on the e5ectiveness of various interventions 
to increase the e8ciency of patent litigation, another 
replied “ALL of the above depend on the judge.”
While discretion is a keystone of our judicial system, 
Congress should promote greater uniformity across 
patent courts. 3is could take place in multiple ways, for 
example, by Congress mandating speci4c practices or 
principles, or by promoting uniform case management 
practices across initiatives like the Patent Pilot Program, 
with outcomes measured through di5erent metrics such 
as cost or time to resolution as a proportion of case 
value, and party satisfaction. 3is would anchor the 
Patent Pilot Program with a deliverable that could be 
used as the basis for further policymaking.
3. Promote Early Rulings on Dispositive Issues.
In the words of one VC survey respondent, patent 
litigation is a “war of attrition” that favors those with 
deeper pockets, more time, and greater expertise.  3ese 
advantages can be undercut, and considerable savings 
captured, by focusing issues and promoting early rulings 
on “dispositive” issues, ones whose resolution would 
resolve the entire case. As one example of a dispositive 
issue, if a court ruled that a patent was invalid on any 
ground, it would moot—or dispose of—the entire case. 
If a court ruled that a patent should be interpreted in 
a particular way, the case could continue, making it a 
non-dispositive issue. 
Among over 500 surveyed inside and outside counsel, 
the highest rated intervention to enhance the e8ciency 
of patent litigation—over fee-shi6ing, over discovery 
reform, and over a host of legislative and judicial 
interventions—was a timely decision on summary 
judgment (SJ) motions, which provide a judgment for 
a party to litigation without a full trial. 75% of outside 
and inside counsel survey takers rated them as “very 
“Right after this case, the judge changed his practice. Now he issues claim construction on the day of the ruling. That 
would have saved us a lot of pain.
“This should be a requirement, that you get it done right then. You’ll never have a better understanding of the case than 
on that day. The longer you wait, the more unfamiliar the material becomes. Even if we had lost, we would have written 
the check and settled, rather than spending another $1.5M on discovery.”
-Laura Smith, Intellectual Property Manager 
For full testimony, see Appendix B.
e5ective” at increasing e8ciency, far more than any 
other intervention. 
For example, the Lodsys involves app developers who 
have implemented functionality provided by the iOS 
App Developer Toolkit. Stepping in on behalf of its 
implementers, Apple asserted an exhaustion defense 
that would shield them from liability. Deciding this 
issue early could dismiss scores of demands and 
litigants from the challenge or, if decided against Apple, 
encourage it to sign an additional license with Lodsys to 
cover its implementers. Other dispositive motions such 
as standing present low risk, high reward propositions 
for the court. If the motion is successful, the case goes 
away. If it is denied, a source of uncertainty is removed 
for the parties and settling becomes easier. To avoid 
waste, it makes sense to know whether or not the cases 
actually pass these basic screens.  In cases where a large 
number of defendants are named, in particular customer 
or implementer suits, where common questions of fact 
provide the basis for liability, the savings potential is 
large. 
3e ITC’s recent innovation of ordering early 
dispositive motions within the 4rst 100-days of a case 
is a great example of how such prioritization may align 
the parties’ and courts’ interests.77  By setting aside a 
period of time to hear dispositive motions as the ITC 
has, unnecessary delays and abuse can be reduced. 
Furthermore, by channeling dispositive motions that 
do not require intensive fact discovery into an early, set 
period, courts can manage against the risk of endless 
serially 4led dispositive motions, except for good cause. 
Again, this intervention is something that could be 
promoted in a variety of ways, including by publicizing 
the results of the ITC’s pilot program and expanding 
some version of it to the Patent Pilot Program, with its 
outcomes measured and promoted, if successful. 
Where possible, prompt rulings in general can provide 
relief to parties. To be fair, judges have heavy dockets 
with many pressing non-patent items. However, ruling 
from the bench as soon as practicable a6er a Markman 
hearing has taken place, rather than months later, can 
capture considerable savings for the court which does 
not have to refamiliarize itself with the details of the 
case, and by helping the parties structure subsequent 
actions and settlements based on an understanding of 
what the case is about.78 Patent risk can also be managed 
not only through early disposition, but early disclosure, 
perhaps under seal, of 4nancial information from which 
damages exposure can be cabined.79  Companies should 
be able to tell their boards the exposure from suit they 
face.
Recommendation 3: Make patent risks more 
manageable for startups.
How: Require demand letters and complaints to disclose 
the real-party in interest, claim charts, related litigations 
and reviews, and licenses that could cover the target, 
and promoting transparency in demand letters.
Heightened Pleading/Demand Standards 
Another source of unnecessary expense and perceived 
risk is generated when a startup receives a demand letter 
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“Our clients don’t have the "nancial ability to hire any patent attorneys to represent them, so proposals that merely 
create more legal mechanisms for challenging patents or deterring them through litigation won’t be of any help. Rather, 
my clients need a system that provides pro bono legal counsel or shelter from such risks, either through an exemption 
or immunity under patent law, or informally through some private risk sharing arrangement like insurance. Individuals, 
non-pro"ts, and small businesses don’t have the money, or the time, to get involved in protracted patent litigation, so 
proposals like fee-shifting won’t help, because they will never get there.”
-Dan Ravicher, Executive Director of Public Patent Foundation 
For full testimony, see Appendix  B.
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and cannot tell what claims of the patent form the basis 
of the demand, what particular product is being accused 
or the theory of infringement, what licenses the patent is 
already covered by, who the real party in interest behind 
the assertion is, whether the patent is in past or present 
litigation, or whether the patent is subject to an ongoing 
administrative review.  If a company understands that 
the basis for infringement is another’s technology, as 
survey respondents reported was the case 40% of the 
time, their set of options—e.g. demanding indemnity 
from the supplier or design around—changes. Or if they 
know that the patent is the subject of a patent review, or 
that the patent has been licensed to certain suppliers of a 
product, the accused company can use this information 
to assess its risk.  If they know who the real party in 
interest is, the target can research the other holdings and 
activities of the party, and better estimate its exposure 
and its options.
3ese basic facts can be costly for members of the 
public, especially those with little experience with 
the patent system, to obtain.  However, they are well 
within the knowledge and ability of the patent holder 
to communicate. With that additional information, a 
target can focus on assessing the risks of infringement 
on the merits, rather than on bridging the information 
asymmetry that frequently characterize patent 
assertions. Congress should consider requiring them.
Congressional proposals to increase the quality of 
litigation pleadings should apply to demand letters as 
well.80 Congress should consider requiring, when a 
party makes a demand or 4les suit, the basic information 
described above. Failure to do so would be tantamount 
to failing to comply with other administrative 
requirements for keeping a patent in force, i.e. paying 
maintenance fees, with the same sort of administrative 
penalties available for non-compliance. 3ese sorts 
of requirements would leverage existing regulatory 
infrastructure and apply narrowly to asserted patents, 
rather than all patents. 
Alternatively or in addition, the PTO and other agencies 
with patent information should also, in accordance 
with President Obama’s directives, work to provide 
authoritative information about patents and options for 
responding that the many companies receiving demand 
letters can rely upon. Who the real party is behind 
the assertion, whether the patent is in past or present 
litigation, or whether the patent is subject to an ongoing 
administrative review is information that could be made 
more readily accessible. By promoting transparency in 
demand letters in partnership with private sector actors, 
this information can also be shared.81  
Recommendation 4: Make startups less 
attractive targets.
How: Limit the liability of small defendants and 
downstream users, and the precedential vale of the 
settlements signed by small companies.
Companies with shallow pockets are typically not the 
favored target of lawsuits. However, survey respondents 
identi4ed two motives that may be present for pursuing 
startups and small companies for patent infringement, 
as users and suppliers: (1) nuisance value (“trolls know 
enough to peg [the] license fee just below [the] cost to 
4ght”), and (2) precedential value (“[Patent holders] 
go a6er startup companies to establish case precedent. 
Startups quickly agree to settle for a low amount because 
they have no money with which to stand up against an 
expensive legal battle. [3e patent holder] then attacks 
larger companies for money, using those previously 
established case precedents”).
One thing that would make startups less attractive 
targets for nuisance demands is for Congress to 
provide some sort of statutory limitation of liability or 
immunity—for example that would apply to companies 
with revenue under a certain threshold82 in general, 
or to companies that are pursued because they are 
downstream users of others’ technology.83 In the latter 
case, the small company usually has worse access to 
information, experts, and 4nancial records regarding 
overall infringement than the supplier of the technology, 
who should bear the responsibility for their product. 
Determining the appropriate threshold would require 
additional analysis and evaluation, however.
A 4nal idea would be for the precedential value of 
royalty agreements signed with small companies to be 
scrutinized and rejected by courts, when appropriate, 
as a fair indication of royalty rates to be set for larger 
companies. 
PRIVATE AND CIVIL SECTOR 
OBSERVATIONS
Because this report is primarily intended for policy 
audiences, it pays great attention to policy development. 
However, the private and civil sectors have historically 
played critical roles in curbing litigation abuses brought 
by “patent speculators,” predecessors to modern day 
patent “trolls.”84  When western farmers in the 1870s 
found themselves the subject of visits by patent royalty 
collectors, agricultural publications and  newspapers 
published articles to “educate the farmer so that he 
would not be so easily duped by the agents” and  farmer 
alliances worked to lobby Congress and the public as a 
result of their members’ dilemmas.85 A6er a sustained 
period of discontent among farmers, the standard for 
granting an agricultural design patent was changed.
When railroads found themselves under attack by patent 
sharks, they banded together through professional 
associations and, for an annual fee, mounted common 
defenses, received full legal services, shared information 
and patent references, helped each other avoid patents, 
and collectively agreed not to settle with patent holders.86 
3ey also lobbied various members of the government, 
resulting in public disapproval of patent shark practices 
and incremental changes in the law.87  3ese tactics were 
successful, e5ectively ending much of the patent shark 
problem.  
While times have changed, many current private and 
civil sector responses mirror those of the past. 3is 
section of the report seeks to both document existing 
private and civil sector self-help tactics as well as to 
share information and disseminate best practices. To 
gather information about o5erings, we consulted with 
as many providers of patent defense services, both non-
pro4t and for pro4t, as we could 4nd, and asked them 
to describe their o5erings. 3e result is re7ected in 
Appendix C-1. To gather information on what tactics 
are being used to defend against NPE assertions and 
how e5ective they are, we did extensive research and 
asked a host of experts. We provide those 4ndings in 
Appendix C-2.
Private and Civil Sector Service O#erings 
Focused on Reducing Risk from NPE Demands
Millions if not billions of dollars are spent on patent 
defense and assertion every year, and greater e8ciencies 
certainly could be captured. Discrete private sector 
and civil sector o5erings for reducing risk from NPE 
demands are largely new —most listed have been 
launched in the last year—and tend to o5er discrete 
solutions to discrete aspects of the patent assertions as 
experienced by companies with particular pro4les.88 But 
questions about the scalability, reach, ability to execute, 
opportunity cost of experts, and lack of viable exits 
for investors caution against “leaving it to the private 
sector,” particularly when it comes to small companies 
and startups. 
Short of a comprehensive market-based solution like 
insurance89 or the dramatic reduction in the costs and 
ine8ciencies of existing patent litigation, it is unlikely 
that private sector service solution providers will be 
able to reduce patent demand risks to a level at which 
companies will no longer demand change from federal 
lawmakers. As pointed out by one company, the 
government has an important role to play as patents are 
a creature of federal law, issued by a federal agency, and 
interpreted by federal courts.90  
Among the solution providers listed, there is an even 
split between the private and civil sectors. A number 
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Advice to small companies: Choose a more a!ordable counsel early on
“We made a huge mistake in choosing our counsel. We picked based on the personality of the lead trial lawyer. From day 
one, we were choosing based on the person that we wanted representing us at trial and the prestige of the law "rm—and 
go to the board and say, “look we have a fancy lawyer.”  We should have done the reverse—chosen an unfancy lawyer 
from a much smaller "rm, and [with a] "xed fee. If we got to the point where it looked like trial was likely, we could switch 
the lawyer 3 to 6 months ahead of time. We’re a good example of how not to buy legal services.”
“Given all the issues you have to deal with at the beginning, it would be my recommendation to go much cheaper, or 
even have one that is willing to go for a "xed fee. You don’t need the most prestigious "rm to handle discovery.”
-Laura Smith, Intellectual Property Manager 
For full testimony, see Appendix B.
of services are o5ered by both types of providers—for 
example demand letter registry (EFF’s Trolling E5ects 
and 3atPatentTool), prior art searching (ArticleOne 
Partners and AskPatents), and defensive litigation 
counsel (PTLCN, Gerchen Keller Capital, and ipCM). 
While these services tend to support or supplement 
traditional legal services, others o5er signi4cantly 
di5erentiated value propositions. One set of services 
aims to work with companies to prevent patents from 
being used in an “o5ensive” manner (IPA, DPL, LOT, 
OPN, OIN). 3e Open Invention Network (OIN) is 
the oldest, launched in 2005 and now including 600 
licensees. It focuses on protecting Linux and other open 
source projects through the creation of a patent cross-
license among community members. Of the others, two 
have been spearheaded by Google, one by Twitter, and 
the fourth by law professors Jennifer Urban and Jason 
Schultz. 3ese “private ordering” initiatives, depending 
on the extent of their adoption, can signi4cantly reduce 
risks for their members; indeed the “patent détente” and 
norm of non-enforcement that existed before the rise of 
patent assertion entities91  did just that for large swaths 
of the technology industry.
RPX is the only public company focused on patent 
assertion. 3ey “acquire and clear high-risk patents 
from the open markets and out of active litigations” 
but also have developed deep intelligence about the 
market and patent assertions. 3ey have recently started 
o5ering an insurance product for small to mid-sized 
companies; historically a lack of data on settlements, 
adverse selection problems, and the di8culty of 
predicting case outcomes has stymied the development 
of robust insurance o5erings.92 Uni4ed Patents has 
also developed an o5ering to proactively deter risks in 
certain technology areas.
So far, no company or alliance has tried to o5er the 
sort of “uni4ed front” of companies systematically 
banding together to resist demands. One problem with 
that business model when it was practical in the past 
is that it became “too successful,” deterring claims so 
e5ectively that it made itself obsolete. In addition, the 
diversity of actors and interests in patent defense makes 
uni4ed collaborations more di8cult. According to large 
company in-house counsel respondents to a survey 
(N=86), 23% had monetized their patents and 28% 
were thinking of doing so.93 Defensive fronts covering 
discrete technologies or sectors are easier to accomplish 
and are contemplated or o5ered by a number of the 
services (e.g. OIN, Uni4ed Patents).
Self-Help Tactics
By far, the largest share of revenue going into defending 
against NPE demands is captured by law 4rms. While 
many 4rms do extensive amounts of patent defense 
work, none to our knowledge has identi4ed itself as 
completely specialized in helping small companies deal 
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with NPE demands. However, as the share of patent cases 
brought by NPEs has risen, so has the level of general 
experience with NPEs within the legal community. 
In the popular media, tactics for responding to patent 
suits like “4ghting,” “ignorance,” and “public shaming” 
are discussed. To disseminate information about the 
usefulness of these and other tactics and their ability 
to reduce costs and risks for startups, we researched 
di5erent tactics and talked to seasoned litigators at 
companies, law 4rms, and nonpro4ts that have deep 
experience with patent litigation, o6en on both sides of 
assertions against small companies. 3e tactics, as well 
as in the collective comments we collected about using 
them, are summarized in Appendix C-2. 
3e tactics can be grouped into several di5erent 
categories: 1) keeping a low pro4le in demands that 
are asserted against a large number of companies; 2) 
the opposite, being a “scorpion”—in other words so 
“poisonous” by being willing to bring ancillary attention 
and claims to the case that the plainti5 moves on to 
other targets; 3) getting help by joining with others, 
either with respect to the speci4c assertions or sharing 
experiences with lawmakers and others in a position 
to in7uence the patent system; 4) reducing costs, by 
carefully managing outside counsel and collaborating 
where it makes sense to do so.
One size does not 4t all and each company needs 
to assess its own risk and situation; nevertheless the 
comments provide a window into what those who have 
tried have found works, and does not work.
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Appendix A: Methodology
A. Sampling Frame 
 In quantitative survey research, the gold standard is to pick a random sample (selection of potential respondents) 
from a larger frame (list or source of the targeted respondents) that is representative of the target population. 3e target 
respondent in this study was either an executive or an investor in a startup with experience with the patent system. 
Since the subject of the study was patent assertion, which not all startups have experienced, I sought a su8ciently large 
number of responses from which to observe and analyze the subject of study.
 To leverage previous research e5orts, I worked with a team of research assistants and a statistics consulting 
4rm, Tech Society Research, to develop a sample of startups and their investors based on the steps described in the 
Berkeley Patent Study.1 3at study drew from two primary sources: 3ompson’s Venture Xpert database and Dun 
and Bradstreet’s company listings with emails. Building upon the steps carried out by the Berkeley Patent Survey, we 
included in our sample companies less than 10 years old with at least one email address. However, rather than limit 
our search to particular industries, as did the authors of the Berkeley Patent Survey, we included companies in any 
industry, for a total of 6,636 addresses, not counting opt-outs or bounced emails.  In addition, we could not include 
the Berkeley Patent Survey’s other key source, Dun and Bradstreet, because as part of transferring the business line to 
Mergent Intellect, academic licenses to company email lists were discontinued in 2012.  
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3us, to supplement the Venture Xpert sample we added 
2,373 additional email addresses, not counting opt-outs 
or bounced emails, of venture capitalists provided based 
on a privately-held proprietary directory of investors. 
We cannot con4rm how many respondents received the 
email, and at least some of the messages were caught by 
respondent spam 4lters. We also encouraged a handful 
of respondents who took the survey and contacted us 
expressing interest in its results to endorse the survey 
and invite colleagues to participate. We do not know the 
precise number of survey-takers that took the survey 
in response to these solicitations. 3e startup survey 
was also provided to listeners of a webcast that I did 
for Engine Advocacy, a Silicon Valley startup advocacy 
group. We received 14 survey responses from this 
source.
We distributed the surveys via web survey. Web surveys 
are increasingly the ‘go-to’ method for data collection 
because they are much less expensive than conventional 
methods, and the results are immediate. However, web 
surveys also su5er from low response rates—single digit 
response rates where no relationship exists between the 
surveyor and the surveyed population are not unusual.2 
Given our low response rate and the fact that the 
sampling frame included only those companies and 
investors whose e-mail addresses were known through 
the methods described above, the survey results should 
not be generalized to the general population. Rather, 
our sample re7ects a hybrid of sampling methods—a 
convenience sample (available lists) and snowball sample 
(direct contacts for inviting people into the study). We 
also employed a mixed methods approach3 for analyzing 
the data. 3at is, we used the numeric results to set a 
context and the open-ended comments provided by 
respondents as thick description behind these numbers. 
3e resulting analysis is a meld of qualitative analysis 
that is informed by quantitative results. While not 
generalizable, the results are instructive for describing 
concerns and impacts of patent demands. 3e yield 
from these e5orts is presented in Table A, above. 
B. Data Collection
We distributed the survey via SurveyMonkey, and sent 
up to eight reminder emails in the case of the startup 
branch of the survey, and up to four reminder emails in 
the case of the VC branch. To encourage participation 
in the study, we gave survey respondents the option to 
receive a copy of the survey results and also told them 
that the purpose of the survey was to gather input for 
a report intended for lawmakers and the members of 
the startup community. However, given cost and related 
constraints, we did not provide additional incentives. 
We did not precede or follow-up email invitations by 
postal mail or telephone. 
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C. Survey Design 
We invited recipients of the survey solicitation to 
participate if they had experience with patents or patent 
assertion, positive or negative. We asked questions 
pertaining to a variety of aspects of the patent system, 
ranging from the reading of patents, to sources consulted 
to obtain information about patents, to licensing and 
patenting behavior and attitudes, to experiences with 
patent assertion. We asked questions pertaining to 
“NPEs” (non-practicing entities) which we de4ned in 
the survey as “an entity that asserts patents as a business, 
not including universities or startups” or “a company 
that asserts patents, rather than makes products, as a 
business.” 
3is paper focuses on the impacts of assertions on 
innovation and young companies; reports on other 
topics will be released at a later date. In the case of the 
startup branch of the survey, question modules were 
provided based on the companies’ experiences – for 
example if a company answered “no” to the question of 
whether it had reserved an assertion, it would not get 
questions about the impacts and its responses to the 
assertions. In the case of the venture capitalist branch of 
the survey, question modules were developed for better 
response rates; the version of the questions received 
depended solely on when the respondent took the 
survey.  
D. Respondent Pro"les
a. Venture Capitalist Respondent Pro4les
We asked venture capitalists to identify their areas 
of investment and the stage of company of primary 
investment. Normalizing the numbers to add to 100% 
(multiple responses were allowed), the highest share of 
respondents among company types were seed or early 
stage investors (74%) (Fig. 1), and among industries, 
were investors in so6ware/internet (46%) (Fig. 2).4
3e respondent group was skewed from the national 
average in two ways:  it had a higher percentage of seed 
and early stage investors (74% in the sample vs. 52% on 
average) (Fig. 1), and an overrepresentation of biotech 
and pharma (23% vs. 13% on average) and  hardware/
semiconductor investors (15% vs. 9% on average), 
relative to the number of 2012 deals (Fig. 2). 3e skew 
in these industries may be explained by the known 
importance of patents to the biopharma  industry, 
relative to others and the prevalence of patents in the 
semiconductor and hardware industries.5
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In order to observe any industry e5ects, for certain 
views we reported the responses of IT (so6ware/
internet, hardware/semiconductor) and biopharma 
(biotech/pharm and medical devices) VCs separately. If 
a VC identi4ed as investing in both, we excluded them 
from both populations.
b. Startup Survey Respondents
We asked survey respondents to answer questions 
about themselves and their companies. 73% responded 
that they were founders or executives, and 12% were 
managers. 93% of the surveyed companies were privately 
held, and the industry of the respondents, similar to the 
population of the VC survey, slightly skewed towards 
the biopharma (17% v. 13%, on average) and hardware/
semiconductor industries (11% v. 9%, on average) (Fig. 
3). 
E. Survey Reporting
3is study reports on the responses of startups and VCs 
to the current survey. However, at times we also report 
(but do not combine) the results from the companion 
surveys described above as well as an earlier study I 
produced in 20126 based on a survey of 223 respondents, 
79 of whom had received a patent assertion demand and 
several of whom had monetized their patents through 
patent assertion entities (PAEs). While containing a 
number of suggestive 4ndings, the survey was a non-
random, non-probability sample, distributed primarily, 
openly to a universe of readers of technology and law 
and public interest/academic blogs that had to “opt-
in” in order to take the survey. 3is study is denoted as 
‘Chien 2012’ and serves as a point of comparison for the 
current study.
In accordance with standard statistical practice as 
applied to this study, we report results with at least 30 
respondents except in the case of smaller sub-samples.7 
Where we asked the respondent to select a range for ease 
of answering, we recalculated the range to a midpoint 
and derived averages based on that number. 
In this report, we refer interchangeably to NPE and 
PAE, which we understand and believe our survey 
respondents to understand does not include universities 
or startups. We quote liberally from survey responses, 
and have removed obvious spelling errors in order to 
improve readability. We also include data on customer 
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suits shared with us by Patent Freedom. Its methodology 
is provided in Appendix D.
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Appendix B: Views from the Trenches 
             VCs, Startups, and Small Business Stories
Dan Ravicher, Executive Director of Public Patent 
Foundation (PUBPAT)
Dan Ravicher is Executive Director of the Public Patent Foundation (PUBPAT), a non-pro"t founded in 2003 
whose mission is to protect freedom in the patent system. PUBBAT advocates for improvements to the patent 
system and educates the public about how the patent system impacts everyday life. It also undertakes speci"c 
litigation and reexamination matters to defend individuals, non-pro"ts, and small businesses from invalid 
patents. Many of its matters have been against patents held by “trolls,” and it has resolved matters for parties in 
litigation against Lodsys and Arrivalstar.
What’s it like for a small startup to receive a patent 
demand?
Imagine you’re a small startup business. You have three employees, including yourself, and you make about $500K per 
year in revenue. You get a patent infringement letter and are referred to some patent attorney who tells you they charge 
$500 an hour and will take at least 40 to 60 hours to review the matter. 3en, if you want this attorney to respond to the 
patent holder, that’s another 20 hours to write letters, do conference calls, etc. Before you know it, you’ve spent $50K 
and had to lay o5 one of your employees. All this time the patent holder is o5ering to settle for $20 to 40K. What are 
you going to do?
Which of the di$erent ideas out there would make a di$erence to your clients?
Our clients don’t have the 4nancial ability to hire any patent attorneys to represent them, so proposals that merely create 
more legal mechanisms for challenging patents or deterring them through litigation won’t be of any help. Rather, my 
clients need a system that provides pro bono legal counsel or shelter from such risks, either through an exemption or 
immunity under patent law, or informally through some private risk sharing arrangement like insurance. Individuals, 
non-pro4ts, and small businesses don’t have the money, or the time, to get involved in protracted patent litigation, so 
proposals like fee-shi6ing won’t help, because they will never get there.
What private sector solution do you favor? 
In most other areas of the law we have a solution called insurance. A small business buys liability insurance to protect 
against customers who get injured in their store or using their products. 3ey get insurance for workman’s comp, 
discrimination claims, etc. If and when they get sued, the insurance company has the deep pockets to defend them. 
And since the patent holder may be targeting many of the insurance company’s clients, they have an incentive to play 
hardball. 3at alone will cause the nickel and dime trolls (as I call them) who focus on small companies to go away. 
3ere are many bene4ts risk consolidation can provide, including overall risk reduction though policy and doctrinal 
changes that only an insurance company can have su8cient resources and incentives to e5ectively pursue. But, the 
mere aggregation of risk produces an e8ciency gain as well while e5ectively allowing disparate small businesses to 
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work together to 4ght common enemies. 
For example, in the automobile context, you have thousands of potential plainti5s suing thousands of potential defendants. 
So, the insurance companies can use actuarial data to assess value of claims and realize the bene4ts of spending more to 
4ght a case than it is worth because the overall deterrent e5ect to other minor claims resulting from that reputation they 
establish for themselves. Similarly, if there was an insurer o5ering patent infringement defense insurance either as an add-
on or part of general business liability insurance, then those insurers will have the resources and incentives to 4ght any 
minor claim made against any of their insured so as to establish a habit of not paying out minor claims.
Insurance is critical for businesses to survive the gamut of tort and employee suits they’re constantly subject to. So long 
as there are plenty of small claims being made to make the transaction cost of insurance worthwhile, it can solve the 
patent nuisance claim problem, too. Also, with IP claims, insurers could o5er only policies to cover the cost of defense, 
not any underlying liability or loss of business resulting from an injunction. 3ey could also cap their payments to $1M 
in expenses. 3at’s enough to mount a defense to a nuisance suit troll and make them go away.
What public sector solution(s) do you favor?
Much like states are immune from patent infringement under the 11th Amendment, Congress could establish an 
exemption for micro businesses (revenues under, say, $1 to 10M per year) from patent infringement. Any business that 
small can’t a5ord to hire patent attorneys to defend themselves, and it isn’t really worth it to the patent holder to litigate 
either, as the potential damages is less than $10 to 100K. For trolls suing or threatening such businesses, their purpose 
is solely to extract a nuisance payment, and while that violates Rule 11, no small business will be able to a5ord to hire 
an attorney to pursue a Rule 11 claim on their behalf. It would cost at least $100K and take at least two years to pursue 
a Rule 11 4nding, which no small business is ever going to be able to take advantage of.
So, why not just categorically exempt micro businesses from patent infringement? To implement that, the law could 
require any notice letters or complaints alleging patent infringement to speci4cally inform the recipient/defendant that 
the exemption exists along with a form declaration that can be returned by the recipient swearing they qualify for the 
exemption. Any letter that doesn’t include the notice and form of declaration does not qualify for purposes of putting 
the recipient on notice and any complaint served without the notice and form of declaration is to be dismissed by the 
Court on its own initiative without motion or appearance by the defendant. A party 4ling a lawsuit, when they 4le 
the a8davit of service, must also 4le an a8davit that the notice of exemption and form declaration was served on the 
defendant as well. 
Also, one of the most critical problems is the issuance of so many invalid patents by the Patent O8ce. 3e PTO makes 
ten times as much money from granting patents as it does from denying patents, and examiners have a much easier 
time making their quota by granting patents, because no one objects, than from rejecting a patent and  defending that 
rejection repeatedly. Until the incentives placed on the o8ce and its employees to grant, rather than deny, patents 
are addressed, there will be too many invalid patents issued that can be strategically used by their holders to extract 
undeserved settlements from others.
What advice would you give to lawmakers about reforming patent law?
As you think about proposals, really ask yourself how what you’re considering would help the small businesses who 
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Laura Smith, Intellectual Property Manager
Names and details have been been changed to protect the identity of the author.
I was Intellectual Property Manager of a Boston-based venture backed company with around 500 employees and 
$40M/year revenue at its peak competing in a fast-paced environment. We were sued by an individual inventor, father-
son team. 3ey had 4led a large number of patents and weren’t doing anything with the technology. 
We knew within about 24 hours of the original suit being 4led that we did not infringe, because the inventor included 
a strongly worded disclaimer in his speci4cation. So we did not settle upfront. From our perspective it was an open 
and shut case.
But it took a year to get to a claim construction where we could make the case. In this 4rst year we spent about 100K 
a month. 3at was bad enough. But then the judge sat on it. During this time we went through discovery at a run-rate 
of $200k per month. We were a startup not making a pro4t. But if we were, that amount would have been a signi4cant 
portion of it.
A year and a half later, the judge FINALLY issued our claim construction ruling. He was not able to provide any 
reasoning or analysis in his opinion and stated that, “with trial in this matter rapidly approaching, the court does not 
wish to add further delay to the constructions by its preparation of a complete opinion setting forth its reasoning and 
analysis.” So, he realized he was taking way too long and decided to simply issue his ruling without a full opinion. 
To make matters worse, his ruling made it in4nitely clear that we CANNOT POSSIBLY INFRINGE. We knew this 
from the start. So not only did we spend $3 million in fees waiting around for a claim construction, but when it 4nally 
arrived it was clear the plainti5 had no case and the whole exercise was a waste. 3e plainti5 immediately stipulated 
to non-infringement. 
Meanwhile, the guys 4led suit over another two patents. 3ey 4led for these patents a6er the bene4t of the Markman 
hearing during which the inventor sat there and got an eight hour tutorial on how to write a better patent on our 
can’t a5ord legal work. Focus on that person, who’s being targeted by the nickel and dime trolls (as I call them), which 
are a completely di5erent beast from the home run tolls (as I call them) who want to sue deep pockets on purpose to 
get a big judgment. I’m not worried about the deep pocket trolls so much because the deep pockets they sue will be 
able to hire lawyers and defend themselves. 
Eliminate injunctions entirely, as the patent system is an economic tool, not a civil liberty. 3ere is always some 
amount of money that can adequately compensate a patentee for infringement (i.e. a trillion dollars would never be 
declined by a rational patentee). 3us, courts should not be focused on whether to grant an injunction, but instead 
what amount of ongoing royalty to require the infringer to pay.
Change the incentives at the PTO to grant patents. 3e decision to grant or deny a patent should be entirely unin7uenced 
by any macro or micro level economic concern. 3e fee structure and quota system both need substantial revision. 
         The Open Technology Institute 47
technology. He then went home and did it. Of course, he claimed priority to much earlier applications with 70 to 80 
page disclosures. 
When faced with the second suit, we knew we would spend all this money again to go into this entire process, and we 
would pay all that money and be worse o5. So even though we had won the 4rst time, the second time it was much 
more attractive to settle—in the low seven 4gures—than to 4ght.
We had run out of cash and were in talks with a Chinese company that didn’t want to deal with it. All of the arguments—
there’s just no way in hell a jury will pay attention it. We had agreed on the price of the company. But then the buyer 
used the lawsuit as leverage to get the price down on the order of $10 million due to the outstanding lawsuit– 20% of 
the value of the company. 3ey said this is a $20M liability which was bogus. But we didn’t have the money to settle it.
What can be done? 
Issue claim construction on the day of the ruling
Right a6er this case, the judge changed his practice. Now he issues claim construction on the day of the ruling. 3at 
would have saved us a lot of pain. 
3is should be a requirement, that you get it done right then. You’ll never have a better understanding of the case than 
on that day. 3e longer you wait, the more unfamiliar the material becomes. Even if we had lost, we would have written 
the check and settled, rather than spending another $1.5M on discovery.
Advice to small companies: Chose a more a#ordable counsel early on
We made a huge mistake in choosing our counsel. We picked based on the personality of the lead trial lawyer. From 
day one, we were choosing based on the person that we wanted representing us at trial and the prestige of the law 
4rm—and go to the board and say, “look we have a fancy lawyer.”  We should have done the reverse—chosen an 
unfancy lawyer from a much smaller 4rm, and with a 4xed fee. If we got to the point where it looked like trial was 
likely, we could switch the lawyer 3 to 6 months ahead of time. We’re a good example of how not to buy legal services.
Given all the issues you have to deal with at the beginning, it would be my recommendation to go much cheaper, or 
even have one that is willing to go for a 4xed fee. You don’t need the most prestigious 4rm to handle discovery. 
Don Ellson, Private Equity Investor
Don Ellson (not his real name) is a Principal at a private equity "rm with over a decade of experience investing 
in early-stage high-tech companies. 
Two of our companies have sold patents to NPEs. 3e 4rst company has been around a long time, so its patents are 
old.  It has now been on the receiving end of three lawsuits by NPEs; in all three we were forced to settle. 3e suits were 
devastating to the company—they almost killed the company. 
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One suit hit the company at a very vulnerable time and almost put it out of business. 3e company learned a lot 
from these experiences and turned around and started licensing to NPEs.  3e 4rst time they did it, they needed 
the money. But then—this is going to sound like prostitution—they realized this was an opportunity to bring more 
resources into the company... Since the 4rst sale, they have periodically looked at their portfolio, and sold groups of 
patents to di5erent litigation entities. Another lawsuit the company had was actually from a NPE that acquired a patent 
from another one of our portfolio companies. I learned this while in the due diligence process while investing in the 
company that sold. 3e person who sold that patent recently told me he regrets selling it, and the company has made a 
point of not pursuing any additional patent licensing.
Net-net, I wish we had never been on either o5ense or defense. I think the company would have been better o5 had it 
never been sued for infringement and never sold patents. In fact, the bene4t of selling patents—their own use of the 
system—didn’t o5set the pain of the lawsuits.
I think patent trolls have a very negative impact for a couple of reasons. First, companies have been forced to spend a 
lot of money that would have otherwise gone into innovation, either because they are defending patents, or 4ling and 
managing patents—an expensive process in its own right. It’s also creating friction in the acquisition process. Buyers 
are warier because they are worried about buying a company and getting sued. On a lot of fronts, it’s been a negative 
on innovation and I don’t see it anywhere as driving innovation. In certain areas—in pharma—patents work. In the 
so6ware world, it’s very much been a negative. I’d rather there be no patents than the current system. Everyone I know 
shares the view that trolls are having a negative impact on innovation. 
Kate Endress, Founder and CEO of Ditto.com
Kate Endress is an athlete turned investor turned e-commerce entrepreneur. 
A$er graduating from Stanford Business School in 2011, Kate cofounded 
DITTO.com, an ecommerce site selling designer sunglasses and eyewear 
which features cutting edge new video “try-on” technology. 
Who are you and why did you partner with a patent troll? 
I am the CEO and Cofounder of DITTO.com, a company I started to make ecommerce work for verticals that had 
currently not migrated online – those with 4tted merchandise.  A6er raising a seed round, my founders and I worked 
countless hours to build our team, 4le for patents on our technology, and build a scalable website. We launched our 
site in April 2012 featuring 4tted eyewear and were o5 to the races.  
We were planning to raise a Series A round during the summer of 2013 but before we could, we were sued for patent 
infringement by our biggest competitor, Wellpoint, who owns 1-800-Contacts and Glasses.com.  Just like that, we were 
faced with an “injunction” threat from a $25B competitor. I was terri4ed our years of hard work were for naught. 
As it turns out, a6er seeing our technology, Wellpoint launched its own o5ering and immediately bought a patent 
which they are now using to sue us. It took me some time to come to grips with that fact that a $25B healthcare 
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company who carefully cra6s the image of being compassionate and caring towards the consumer would go on the 
aggressive against a 13-person startup. I can only speculate that they fear that the patents we 4led (which take years to 
issue!) will become a weapon towards them down the road. But if they would have just called me before 4ling a lawsuit 
against us, they would know we applied for those patents for defensive purposes, not o5ensive ones. I care more about 
building a superior customer experience than I do about going a6er them with patents. 
I had to come up with a defense strategy. A6er doing our own assessment and talking with a host of talented lawyers, 
we still don’t think we infringe. But how expensive it would be!  Every attorney I spoke with estimated it would take 
several million dollars over several years to prove that we didn’t infringe. Obviously we weren’t a position to be able 
to a5ord that! I stopped all marketing spending to ensure every dollar went to support our litigation, I laid o5 several 
employees to further stem costs, and then I went searching for someone who could help. 
I worked my tail o5 to 4nd a lawyer to work for equity on my case, to no avail. Several were willing to take half equity 
or quarter equity in my company but it wasn’t enough given their outrageous hourly fees. I had one lawyer friend who 
was going to quit his job at his big 4rm to work to for me, but I realized one young litigator from Indiana wasn’t going 
to be enough to battle this $20B company in Utah.  When you get sued in Utah, you must have a Utah-based litigator 
to defend you, which was di8cult given that we are located in the Bay Area.  I also worked hard to 4nd an investor 
to fund our 4ght, but the feedback was consistent: “You have a $25B competitor who put a target on your back.  Why 
wouldn’t they just keep purchasing patents to keep suing you to run you out of business? It’s too risky.”  3e fact that 
legal fees are o6en sunk costs (given that there isn’t a fee-shi6ing mechanism in place yet) also makes it harder to raise 
money for litigation. 
I even went so far as to run a sale process for my business, which was incredibly depressing. Buyers were dinging our 
valuation $3 to 4M for the lawsuit, so I felt we couldn’t even sell it for what it was worth. 
It was a challenging 4ve months as I 4gured out a game plan that gave us a path forward and a shot.  3at solution was 
a deal with Erich Spangenberg.  Many people think of Erich as a patent troll. I met him while speaking as a panelist at 
a patent reform conference a few months ago and my 4rst reaction to him was probably exactly what you think. I had 
a clenched jaw and a red neck (I’m the worst poker player ever because I literally wear my emotions).  But we got to 
speaking and he told me that as he heard me speak, he realized that there was an incredible opportunity. He went on 
to explain his plan to take on my case, pay for all legal expenses associated with it, and free me up to run my business 
in exchange for equity in my business on a contingency basis for about half of what I was projecting it would cost me 
in cash to 4ght it myself.  I was skeptical at 4rst, but the more diligence I did on him and this deal, the more I realized 
it was a very smart (if not opportunistic) market-based solution to my problem. His o5er made sense because 1) it 
makes us less vulnerable due to his reputation and resources, so it reduces the chance of being sued over and over; 2) 
the price we negotiated was fair given the circumstances; 3) he has real domain expertise and an arbitrage opportunity 
on costs; 4) he has a much higher likelihood to negotiate our lawsuit away given his resources and assets; 5) I could 
go back to running my business and not be neck-deep in litigation for a few years, which would have created huge 
negative consequences for my company and team.
Erich Spangenberg sees this as an opportunity to get equity in great startups for doing what he does best.  So until the 
day that we have a properly functioning patent system, his solution is my best option.  When a huge company puts a 
target on your back, sometimes you need to powerful friends to have a shot at surviving.
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Brad Burnham, Union Square Ventures
Brad Burnham is a managing partner at Union Square Ventures (USV), an early stage venture capital "rm based 
in New York City focused on young companies that use information technology in innovative ways to create high 
growth business opportunities. Over the past 10 years, it has been directly involved in the development of 61 
companies and has, through its prior "rms, participated in the launch of over 120 companies. 
Union Square Ventures
Union Square Ventures, founded in 2003, is a venture capital "rm based in New 
York City.
The "rm currently manages $450,000,000 across three funds. Companies 
in Union Square Ventures investment portfolio include Twitter, Tumblr, Etsy, 
Foursquare and Kickstarter, among others. 
NOTE: !e following is adopted from testimony provided to the FTC/DOJ at their workshop on Patent Assertion Entities 
on December 10, 2012.
I’m an investor who invests primarily in internet services. With that I come to this question with a unique perspective. 
We were, for instance, the 4rst institutional investor in Twitter, Tumblr, Foursquare, Etsy, four companies that have 
now created over 1,500 jobs. I have become very involved in the patent question, because about one-third of our 
portfolio—we have 45 companies in the portfolio—has been sued by someone. About almost half has been given some 
kind of demand letter by someone. 
Twitter for instance has 14 active patent actions against it—once you get to a certain scale, everybody comes out of 
the woodwork and asserts that you have violated their intellectual property.  What’s frustrating about this from my 
perspective as an investor is that none of these companies that we have invested in knew about these patents. And I’ve 
heard arguments made that, well, gosh, they were irresponsible. 3ey could have searched the patent o8ce to 4nd 
these patents. But in fact, that really is not true. Most of the patents that have been asserted were asserted from an 
entirely di5erent 4eld. 
I’ll use one example of a company that is not entirely out of business, but is a tiny shell of its former self as a result 
of being subjected to two patent suits in rapid succession by two di5erent entities, neither of which would 4t the 
de4nition of an NPE or a PAE. Both were failed entrants. Both were failed start-ups. 3e company was in the business 
of providing advertising services to major brands. 3e 4rst suit that we were hit with was from a company that was not 
in the business of advertising services at all. It was a business-to-business company that was providing so6ware, not 
services, to a completely di5erent industry—law enforcement. 3ere’s no way we could have searched for that patent. 
3e second suit we were hit with also was so completely di5erent than what we were doing. 3at hurt when they sued 
us. But it didn’t have a huge e5ect. 3ey hadn’t gotten an injunction. 
But then they went on to sue our customers. So these are people like American Express and American Airlines, and 
General Motors. 3e company in question employed 70 people. We were doing about $10 million in annual revenue, 
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and when they sued our customers, this was a nice to have, not a need to have, it was a marketing program for the 
customers. 3e suits cut our revenue in half in three months. And so we couldn’t sustain the 70 people that we had on 
the payroll, and so we had to cut the company in half. 
And as we fought this patent suit, we tried to indemnify our customers. Our customers said “3anks, but I mean, it’s 
not going to help. It’s not worth it for me. I don’t want to be involved in this. You 4gure it out.”
And so ultimately we were not able to raise additional capital into the company, and we ultimately shrunk the company 
back to 4ve. 3e company now has 4ve people servicing their existing clients, and no longer employing those 70, or 
65 people that they had employed. 
Name/Service 
Provider
Service Description & Status Cost/How To Participate When to Use Their Services, Turnaround Time, and 
Contact
Target Client Profile
Patent Troll Law Clinic 
Network (PTLCN) 
(Application Developers 
Alliance, a trade 
association)
Pro bono legal 
services to 
small 
companies
Multistate network of law school clinics that aims to provide pro 
bono services to small companies that have received a demand 
letters from or been sued by a patent troll. Students (advised by 
faculty and private law firm advisors) will conduct prior art 
searches, infringement analyses, and related research, and advise 
client entrepreneurs regarding legal options.  Students will also 
prepare petitions for reexamination/review that challenge patents 
owned by trolls. Launch Date: Fall 2013
PTLSCN does not charge, and neither do 
most (or perhaps all) law school clinics. 
However, clients may be responsible for 
various fees (e.g., court filing fees) associated 
with their individual legal concern. 
Upon receiving a demand letter, and hopefully before 
you contact the demanding troll.  Contact: Chris Beal, 
chrisb@appdevelopersalliance.org; devsbuild.it
Developers and small 
companies threatened by 
patent trolls.
Trolling Effects 
(Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, a 
technology policy non-
profit)
Demand letter 
registry and self-
help site
Essentially a database of troll demand letters that recipients have 
uploaded. The point is to provide a free resource for potential and 
actual troll targets to inform themselves about the senders' 
identities and modus operandi. The website also provides guides 
to the patent system and reform. Thus, no direct legal assistance 
is provided to those under attack, but it creates transparency 
around a niche of litigation that seems to thrive on a lack of such 
in addition to providing general information about the litigation 
process for targets that are under attack. Non-profit (project of 
EFF and coalition). Launch Date: July 2013
Free. The primary audience is demand-letter 
recipients who are encouraged to submit their 
documents, browse other letters, and learn 
more about their situation. However, to help 
facilitate further research, we’ve made it easy 
to export public data from the website so 
academics, journalists, and policymakers can 
do more thorough research. 
Upon receiving a demand letter, or if an entity would 
like to learn more about patent trolls. Submitted 
demand letters are published within days. Otherwise, 
there is no turnaround time. Contact: Adi Kamdar, 
adi@eff.org; trollingeffects.org
Recipients of demand 
letters.
PatentFreedom NPE 
intelligence
A database of information about non-practicing entities (NPEs) 
and the litigation that they bring. PatentFreedom collects 
information about NPEs, their background and network of affiliated 
shell entities, the patents that they assert, the defendants they 
attack, and the attorneys that fight for and against them so that 
targets can plan how they will respond to a demand letter. 
Companies that want access to this information can subscribe to 
the service. Additionally, PatentFreedom offers custom research 
and advisory services for clients that desire it. Subscribers can 
also contribute to the database themselves. Privately held. Launch 
Date: 2008
A basic subscription costs $10,000/year, and 
the intended audience are companies with 
"limited NPE exposure", or smaller 
businesses: to be eligible for the basic 
subscription, a company needs to have faced 
no more than 7 NPE-induced litigations over 
the last three years. More expensive plans 
exist for companies with higher NPE exposure 
and custom research is priced on a case-by-
case basis. Companies access the database 
and contribute to it through the service's 
website. The typical audience includes both 
businesses that are targeted by NPEs and the 
law firms that deal with the litigation.
Most clients will use the service upon being hit with a 
demand letter so that they can learn more about the 
NPE that sent it. Other clients, though, will use the 
information on the website to perform risk analysis 
before engaging in activities that may draw the ire of 
NPEs. Submissions are posted within the week; 
otherwise, once a company has a subscription they 
have access to the information. Contact: 
info@patentfreedom.com;
www.patentfreedom.com
Law firms and businesses 
that deal with troll-induced 
litigation. The baseline 
seems to be 7 NPE-related 
cases within 3 years.
That Patent Tool Demand letter 
registry and self-
help site
Similar to Trolling Effects, That Patent Tool is a website where 
companies can upload demand letters that they've received from 
trolls, see demand letters that others have submitted, and 
anonymously discuss issues related to trolls and demand letters. 
The site will provide members with a "Quarterly Troll Review" that 
will draw conclusions about the trolls based on the materials that 
have been submitted.  The QTR will contain predictions about 
possible future troll targets, as well as interviews with industry 
experts. Privately held. Launch Date: June 2013
The site as-is is free to use, though users 
need to become members. There are future 
products and services in development that 
may cost members, though the first 50 to sign 
up for and submit demand letters to That 
Patent Tool receive all future tools free.
Upon receiving a demand letter. Contact: Steph 
Kennedy, skennedy@898data.com; 
www.thatpatenttool.com
Any company, small or 
large, that has received a 
patent demand letter. Law 
firms who, on behalf of their 
clients, would like to track 
patent trolls.
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Name/Service 
Provider
Service Description & Status Cost/How To Participate When to Use Their Services, Turnaround Time, and 
Contact
Target Client Profile
Article One Partners Crowd-sourced 
patent research
Article One Partners, the world’s largest patent research 
community, has revolutionized the transparency of patent data. 
Clients use the power of the AOP crowd to defend in litigation and 
assess validity positions for all use cases across the patent 
lifecycle. Privately held. Launch Date: 2008
Article One Partners has products to fit the 
budget and litigation stage needs of clients, 
from $2,000 to $7,000 for private searches to 
$25,000 for full crowdsourced research. AOP 
also offer strategic memberships to clients 
from worldwide brands to start-ups.   
Services may be used in pre-litigation or litigation 
defense, USPTO proceedings such as Inter Partes 
Review or Covered Business Method patent review 
proceedings, ITC defense, due diligence, analysis of 
industry standards, evidence of use, patent 
purchasing, or customized to meet clients' needs. 
Article One Partners research can be completed in as 
little as two business days, and generally is completed 
in 5 weeks with the crowd optimizing the research.  
Contact: www.articleonepartners.com; 
www.go.articleonepartners.com/request-a-quote
Clients range from individual 
app developers to global 
companies, including 18 of 
the top 25 companies most 
pursued by NPEs.  
Ask Patents 
(StackExchange)
Crowd-sourced 
question-
answer service 
for U.S. Patent 
Applications 
and U.S. 
Patents
Ask Patents is a free web service where users both pose 
questions relating to the patent system and answer the questions 
of others. Prior art questions represent the most frequently-posed 
requests, but questions are often asked about other areas, such 
as patentability and infringement. The community is focused on 
prior art searches for software patent applications in the U.S., but, 
given the format, it can potentially address any issue that the 
patent system could present an innovator. The community is 
focused on finding prior art for US Software Patent Applications. 
However, anytime someone posts an issued software patent 
which is currently in litigation by a known troll they see a lot of 
answers. Because of the uniquely strong SEO position of Ask 
Patents (and the Stack Exchange network generally), if a prior art 
request has been posted on Ask Patents it is very likely to be one 
of the top two results on Google and other search engines. 
Examiners are free to google a patent number as part of their non-
patent-literature diligence and they are free to look at the answers 
on Ask Patents and form an opinion as to whether the answers are 
good prior art for the subject application. Non-profit. Launch Date: 
2012
The website is free. Users simply visit the site 
and ask/answer questions.
Anytime you have a concern about a pending U.S. 
patent application, whoever it is held by.  The first 
answer to a prior art search question is usually posted 
within 3 hours of the question's posting. Contact: Micah 
Siegel, msiegel@stackoverflow.com; 
patents.stackexchange.com
Entities concerned with a 
pending U.S. patent 
application
Defensive Patent 
License (DPL)
Patent License The DPL is an off-the-shelf license that focuses on defensive 
commitments. Each licensor agrees to offer licensees full royalty-
free access to her portfolio in return for a reciprocal commitment to 
do the same. With each new licensor, the network of permanently 
defensive patents grows. Entities outside the network can still be 
pursued offensively. Importantly, the DPL’s obligations “travel with 
the patent” so that in the event of sale or other transfer, its new 
owner must also abide by the DPL’s terms. This ongoing 
obligation could help limit lawsuit risk, especially for the risks 
posed by patent trolls, as a patent that can only be used 
defensively is likely to have less value for a troll. Planning to 
launch as a non-profit. Launch Date: November 2013 (Anticipated)
The license will be freely available. There are 
also plans for a pro bono network of patent 
prosecutors who will waive their fees for 
patentees committed to the DPL.
Companies should use the DPL as part of their overall 
patent strategy. Contact: Jason Schultz, 
SchultzJ@exchange.law.nyu.edu; 
www.defensivepatentlicense.com
Any company that wants to 
make a commitment to 
defensive patenting and use 
network effects to limit 
patent risk overall.  The DPL 
is especially well suited for 
companies and individuals 
who do not plan to monetize 
or assert their patents 
offensively.
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Name/Service 
Provider
Service Description & Status Cost/How To Participate When to Use Their Services, Turnaround Time, and 
Contact
Target Client Profile
Open Patent Non-
assertion (OPN) Pledge
Legally-
enforceable 
non-assertion 
agreement 
The OPN Pledge is an agreement by Google (for now) to not 
assert certain patents against those using them for open-source 
software. Once a patent has been pledged, the pledge becomes 
legally binding on whomever owns the patent; thus, if Google were 
to sell or otherwise transfer rights to the patent, the pledge would 
still apply to the subsequent owner. Anybody can then use the 
patent without fear of a legal attack as long as they meet the 
conditions of the pledge. Google also retains the right to 
defensively terminate the pledge if one of the developers or users 
attacks or benefits from a patent attack against Google. This 
allows Google to fight back against companies that use shell 
corporations or proxies to assert their patent rights. Ideally, in the 
future, more patent owners, such as large corporations, developer 
organizations, and newer growing companies, will pledge their 
patents along with Google's in order to encourage innovation in 
the open-source environment. Publicly held (originally developed 
by Google, but is available for any other patent owner to adopt). 
Launch Date: March 2013
As long as a developer or user is utilizing the 
patent rights as the pledge dictates, there is 
no cost.  For companies wishing to adopt the 
pledge, there may be some costs associated 
with selecting patents for pledging.
Contact: OPN Pledge Team, opnpledge@google.com; 
g.co/opnpledge
Anybody developing or 
using open source software 
is a target "client" (or, more 
appropriately, "pledge 
recipient").  Similarly, the 
OPN Pledge is targeted to 
any patent owner wishing to 
use patents in the service of 
open source software 
("pledge adopter").
License On Transfer 
(LOT) Agreement/
Google
License upon 
Transfer of 
Patents
Google is gathering a group of companies together to enter into 
this LOT agreement, which will be administered by an 
independent organization.   Under the terms of the LOT 
agreement, every LOT User agrees that when it transfers a patent, 
the transferred patent automatically becomes licensed to the other 
LOT Users existing at the time of the transfer, except (i) a transfer 
that is part of a legitimate M&A activity or (ii) a transfer to another 
LOT User. This structure protects LOT Users from being subject to 
the extraction of patent rents by the entity (e.g., a patent assertion 
entity) to which the patent is sold. Launch Date: Fall 2013 
(Anticipated)
The parties to the agreement will split the 
administrative costs, which are expected to be 
low and capped (less than $20k/year/party). 
Potential members need only sign on to the 
agreement and pay their share of the 
administrative costs.
Your company should consider joining the LOT 
community if it:
a) Is optimistic about is future, e.g., has large or 
growing revenue or plans to have large or growing 
revenue 
b) has a PAE problem or is likely to have one in the 
future; or
c) places greater value in freedom to operate than in 
pure patent sales to PAEs, e.g., if your company 
doesn’t make a noticeable portion of its revenue from 
pure patent sales to PAEs. Contact:  
LOT@google.com; 
www.google.com/patents/licensing/lot
Any operating company or 
startup that is optimistic 
about its future.
Innovator's Patent 
Agreement (IPA)
Agreement to 
only assert 
patents 
defensively
The IPA is a new way to do patent assignments that keeps control 
in the hands of engineers and designers. It is a commitment from 
Twitter, and other companies, to their employees that patents can 
only be used for defensive purposes. If the patent is asserted for 
any other reason, the IPA member will need the inventor’s 
permission. Privately held. Launch Date: 2012
Free Companies should join the IPA as part of their overall 
patent strategy. Information: 
https://blog.twitter.com/2013/brewing-our-first-
innovator%E2%80%99s-patent-agreement-patent-0
Company should consider 
joining the IPA to assure 
their employees that their 
patents will be used only as 
a shield rather than as a 
weapon.
Docket Navigator Searchable 
online docket 
database
Four main components are included in the service:
(1) The Docket Report (daily email reporting activity in the district 
courts, ITC and PTAB) 
(2) Docket Navigator (searchable online database)
(3) Docket Alerts (customized saved searches that alert you when 
new patent litigation activity occurs)
(4) New Case Alerts (intra-day notifications of new patent cases 
filed). Privately held. Launch Date: 2007
The service utilizes a subscription-based 
pricing model based on the number of users. 
For example, a single user is $55 per month, 
and the aggregate monthly cost gradually 
increases based on the number of users, up to 
100+ users, priced at $1,000 per month.
If concerned with pending or potential patent litigation. 
Contact: Amy Towell, amy@docketnavigator.com; 
www.docketnavigator.com
Companies and individuals 
concerned with patent 
litigation.
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Name/Service 
Provider
Service Description & Status Cost/How To Participate When to Use Their Services, Turnaround Time, and 
Contact
Target Client Profile
Unified Patents Inc. 
(Unified)
NPE assertion 
and litigation 
reduction 
through deterre
nce
Unified reduces the risk and cost of NPEs on behalf of companies 
in specific technology areas of high NPE activity. Unified monitors 
NPEs in these areas and uses annual subscription fees 
toproactively defend against NPE activity. Rather than encourage 
NPEs through settlement, Unified deters or eliminates future NPE 
activity, thereby reducing NPE risk and cost. Privately held. 
Launch Date: Early 2013
Membership is free for startups and costs a 
modest annual fee for large companies. 
Unified’s members only subscribe to (and pay 
for) technology areas relevant to their 
business, thereby delivering strategic ROI.
Unified is actively defending a number of technologies 
experiencing high NPE activity.  Companies can join 
Unified at any time to reduce their risk and cost of NPE 
activity. Contact: Kevin Jakel, 
CEO, kevin@unifiedpatents.com; www.unifiedpatents.c
om
Any company in a 
technology area which has 
or is concerned with NPE 
activity.
Gerchen Keller Capital Litigation 
finance 
solutions
GKC offers defense-side financing solutions for all types of legal 
claims, including patent claims. In addition to investing in 
meritorious litigation, GKC assists parties in evaluating the 
strengths and weaknesses of litigation claims or defenses, the 
potential costs of litigation, the range of potential damage awards, 
and the expected economic benefit or cost of maintaining 
particular claims or defenses. Privately held. Launch Date: April 
2013
The cost of services depends upon a variety of 
factors, including the merits of the claim or 
defense and the estimated time to a 
resolution. With respect to small companies, 
the arrangements can provide for repayment 
over time or compensation through equity or 
other means.
Funding alternatives are available from the moment 
litigation is contemplated or threatened until after final 
judgment is entered. Contact: Travis Lenkner, 
tdl@gerchenkeller.com; www.gerchenkeller.com
Clients are commercial 
enterprises that want to 
offset risks associated with 
litigation and litigation 
defense. A typical case 
involves potential damages 
of at least $10 million.
RPX Preemptive 
open market 
patent 
acquisition
The RPX network can provide measurable risk and cost reduction 
for any company experiencing NPE litigation.  All members of the 
network pay an annual fee (scaled to reflect the size of the 
member company) which is used to acquire and clear high-risk 
patents from the open markets and out of active litigations.  
Publicly held. Launch Date: 2008
Membership fees start at $75,000, and scale 
depending upon size of the company. In 
certain cases, RPX will consider special 
circumstances for start-ups or early-stage 
companies. RPX Insurance is also priced to 
reflect small company circumstances and is 
based on specific forward-looking risk for each 
policyholder as determined by their actuarial 
models.
RPX’s preemptive open market patent acquisitions are 
the most efficient way to deploy the network’s capital 
and provide the most attractive ROI for members, so 
joining the network early and benefiting from their 
ongoing acquisitions is the most effective strategy. 
Member companies also benefit from RPX's ability to 
intervene in active litigations. The goal is to provide 
members the broadest and most cost-effective risk 
mitigation possible.  A company can become an RPX 
member at any time. Ideally, contact with RPX would 
initiate before engaging legal counsel. Contact: 
info@rpxcorp.com; rpxcorp.com
Any company facing a 
litigation claim or wishing to 
resolve a current or potential 
assertion/litigation without 
incurring high defense or 
settlement costs. Whether 
RPX serves as the 
intermediary to purchase out 
of the open market or in 
relation to a litigation, RPX 
brings to bear its expertise 
to help ensure that its clients 
are able to take a more 
efficient and cost-effective 
approach to handling NPE 
litigation.
IP Claims Management 
(ipCM)
Litigation 
financing, 
management 
and strategic 
advisory
For smaller companies that are in the early stages of dealing with 
actual patent litigation. ipCM also offers a unique financial product 
that is priced to reflect the imminent risk of each particular 
company with payment only upon success. Privately held (an 
affiliate of IPNav). Launch Date: May 2013
Payment can be in equity (typically half of 
what the expected legal bill to be valued at the 
company's latest rounds valuation) or cash. If 
ipCM fails, the company pays nothing.
Companies can use ipCM services at any time--before 
or after litigation is commenced. Evaluation within 
days. Contact: info@ipcmadvisors.com; Website 
forthcoming
Ones that are tired of paying 
law firms with valuable cash 
with no guarantee of 
success.
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Name/Service 
Provider
Service Description & Status Cost/How To Participate When to Use Their Services, Turnaround Time, and 
Contact
Target Client Profile
Open Invention 
Network (OIN)
Fully paid-up 
royalty licence
Provides a fully paid-up royalty free license to OIN pro-competitive 
defensive patent pool in exchange for a commitment to forbear 
litigation around Linux and to cross-license its own patents to 
other members. OIN holds over 400 U.S. patents and applications 
and has nearly 600 licensees that are part of its growing 
community of entities committed to patent non-aggression in open 
source and Linux.  Privately held. Launch Date: 2005
Free to become a licensee. Anytime your company is engaged in Linux or open-
source activities. Contact: Keith Bergelt, 
kbergelt@openinventionnetwork.com; 
http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/about.php
Any company with an 
interest in open source 
software.
Allied Security Trust I 
(AST)
Defensive 
patent 
availability 
monitoring and 
purchasing
Monitoring of the high tech secondary patent market and collective 
defensive purchasing of patent assets.  Launch Date: January 1, 
2007
For companies $4B or larger in annual 
product/service revenue, $150K one time fee 
plus $200K annual fee.  For companies 
between $250M and $4B, $150K annual fee.  
Membership fees have the potential to go 
down as AST grows. 
When your company wants a cost effective solution to 
monitor patents available on the secondary patent 
market and to secure freedom to operate through a 
defensive license at a lower cost through a 
collaborative bid with other similarly situated operating 
companies. Contact: Linda Biel, lbiel@ast1.com; 
www.alliedsecuritytrust.com
Operating companies in the 
high tech industry.
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                 Appendix C-2: Tactics for Responding to Patent Assertions
  
To disseminate best practices and information we developed a list of tactics for responding to a NPE suit culled from interviews and research. We then solicited advice from experts about how these tactics fare in 
practice. We received comments from attorneys practicing at law!rms, in-house counsel, solution providers, and a public interest lawyer and summerized their feedback in the “Ask the Experts” column.
	
 

#1#%*
$&$$  
!# ##%
!!%%
!!% 
*%* &'
 #$ &%
!!%%
!!% 
	
)#(#
 %!# ##%
*%* &'
 #$ &%
!!%%
!!% 
% 
&$$
*%* &#
%#!&#$
#%
 * *%
	 
  
	

 !%% #4$! #%  ,   #%#!!!% $
 $#$&%%!# ##%%( ##$ !!% $/
( ( $&$$ $%%# .;3> %$  (!&%  
%!!% - #<3 #%#$%% / #$ #$ %#
$
 %  (##%% ',%$&$$ &$%
 #%/.%) &#!&%5;:&%$5
%##$%5!%%5< %$/
2%%!.00(((/  $ %(#/ 0%$0<:;=0:?0<</%3
# ##%,*$$ %
!# ##%##$-
 7;@: #
 #%%#
##$,!% 
*+%
!# ##%( &! $
% )!$$/
 & 4%'&#%%%%!%% ($%#%$
'%,%!%%$$$& %(%$%%,%## $$
$  %$%*% &$% %!%%%#/
%  # &$%
!# ##%$# #&#%%$%%/
 !%% #4$! #%  ,&$$%$%%$% $ #
!# ##%% !# ' !%%/$&!!#%$#$ 
  $#*%!%% &$ $%%$4
'$%*(%%)# &%*/. &$ &$
!%,*,%!# $&% $% #*#*"&*
%%&# $#*$&$%$, %#"&#$,%%%  %!# ##%,$$&
$ $!# '#$! $% * &#"&$% /
%!%$&#%!# &#%!# $$'% 
&$$/.#'%%'/ #)!,%*&$' #
#%!# %% !*# $*#"&#%$&!!# 
%!# &% #$#'%%'$#$% %!%%% %
 !*/% !# '$ !# !#* %$#$% %
$&!!#,%!#%*%%$%$%! $% % &#$%$$$$%
#$ ,!# '$  %' #%$&!!#% %%
%%%&$# !**
2%%!.00*$  (/ $! %/ 0<:;=0:>0% 1&$$1
#%1% /%3/
#$,&%%$% $%
  %% 
4%&#%% $,$!** &#&$% #/* &#! $% % 
 %$,%4$#%/&%'%&##%$%% %!%%$*$%,
&#$%(*$&!!#$ 4%*/
 %%##%$(%%!!# !#%#$  #$$
0 #%#$%% )!%! $% $$/. 
!*
	  #$$! !#%#*% %&% %$$$& ($ %4$  %
% $#* &#)!#$(%%!%%$*$%/
          58 New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute
	
 

	!(&'%,! !,' 

")%',4!
%,!"*
&'' !'
 !4('
","(%%&%  !
	 
  
	

	!',&, #''"%&(##"%')'%%"(#&!!"!5#%"'&2'
"!!''"%&"(%&/%"  !'"!&/!#",'"!&2 !1"!
#,

"!!&(&(,% 9!'9!%'''%&"%%"(#&!!#'!'%"% 2"&
"(&"!&'%'(#&!(/!!)",/'##)"#%8&
!/!>DDC2''#144***2#'!'#%"%&&2"%4"( !'&45'!'5
''%5'"5"!%&&40''#&144***22"%4"( !'4"#!5''%5&5'0"%
'*"  (!',/	(%,"('""!	!'%!'&&"'"!/*&
'),*"%!"!'%,!'"&")'#'!''%"#%" 2
	!"% '"(''" #!,8&!!&'('"!!'',"(%,
%!3'*"%''%' 2&*''*'"%' '""*,/!
('' '''%3&%,!"%)!(%" '(&#%"('&
6''#144'%(!2" 4?=>?4>=4=D4>=5*,&5&'%'(#&5!55*'5
#'!'5'%"5 !&472 !1!$(,!&'' !',! 
!  	,"(&,,"()!"%)!(/,"(8''%!"'(!/! (&'%,
'"!%(#',''%"&(&,"('","(%(2&"&1	,"()
 ' "!,/!)&'&" ' !('!'"'%&1*,%&*%
'',"(" #'(!!"%;@ "!!'!'*,%&&&( ,"(
)#"'',!%"(!'',"(!)'"' 2('"!&
%'!,"()'"'!(',(!%&'!2%% !,
#'!'&''%)!'& &''"!"'%"!-''&" ' &'!
!&&'*&'!'""2	"!8''%"%& " #!&''%(!
(# !!(''!"!)%,%"!'6!"!5!% !'!!)',7
"!,'"'!&'%',)%(!(#2	'!'''%'!
'""(&"!&''&& " #!,"(%&,&' &!"'&'(#"%,"(2
)!,"(9*!9'%?A "!'&/&"*'.
&%&"(%&'"!"('& (&#"&&"(''*&('2'%"(
"( !'&/"(%'"'&/!*&'&'"!"(')%,'!,"(!
"(''#"#!'*&('2 !1  ',#,"(
!"% ,"(%&'%',2'!'!&/""'!'&/!
%#'!'&"!!2" %%"  !& "%(&%%!,'!'
"%''!!"% '"!"(''#'!'2&&'&""
!&'%('"!&"!"*'"(&'#'!'"&%!!1
''#144***22('+&2(4!!4#'!'5'('"%4'('"%4#''('2' 2
!%!"*!!'"*""*!&'#'!'/,"(!'"''%'&
"!"%#"%'"!'"&'"*!%"'"%#%'!%&#2"&'&''&
)"%#"%'%&'%'"!&%!!2&&'&!&'"'
&''%&'%'"!&%&'&/*%!%,%1
''#144***2""%!'2" 4%'%,''2' 2&"
''#144#!",2" 4?=>@4=D4?C4"*5'"5&('%55#'!'5'%"5!5B5
&'#&42
!  "(/"%	,"()"'" "!,/,"(%*,%/*"'&2''!,"(%!&
%',/#%'(%,!'#%"%%'/&','"&(&&2!',/&#!&" 
' ''!'"!"*'%'/*"*&"!*'"%'%''/!
%"(''"%#"#'"''"' "('#!,"(*''%' !
'%'&' "!,2
          59 New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute
	
 

'#&.
')& #
$%8, +
&%,+') &))+
*)
$%8, +
&##&)+8& %
*%%+*
$%8, +
	 
  
	

&)*$##&$'% *3+)7*)*&%#%+++0<)&%#0&%&
$%0) - %$%#++)6"#&&"++'+%+%+
##+ &%*4 0&,%&)$)*&%## ++# %* *%&+%3
 #+#++).0:++'588+),%6&$8B@AB8A@8@D8A@9.0*9*+)+,'*9
%9#9. +9'+%+9+)&##9$%*8;6 $ %5
+$0 #(, "#03*,** %
+&)$&+'# %+ %-)## %0&,"+"*#&%)
 % $#9% %)+ $ 
##+ *+=') ) &=),#99+&%++&$*&,+&+%+*+%6

$%0#++)*) %*%+3"'#&.')& #. #& %+)$ % $,$
+&-& . ##,# %) %$%+:+&,)+&"%&..+++ *++ *'& %+;6

%&)%.&)"* %*&$**%*&,#+ % + #)*'&%*6,* 
0&,+#"+&+)&##30&,. ##&'%,'#&%&%-)*+ &%. ++$++. ##
)*,#+ %0&,)'0 %+$&)#.0)$&%06)%+&# -. ++&'%
+)+6
&%,+') &))+*)*+&%&,)*+&*++#,) %)# )*+*
&# + + &%&)+&.)&$%6) &))+*)*%&%&%
*&$&)##&+'+%+*#0+3.+)&)%&++0.)
**)+6& + %&,*9#&&"*'6&)%&%9'+%+') &))+2&$% %)*
-+% #$%,#*3 0&,&+/+)$ #0&,7## %*+,6 $ %5
0*+&."*+&&$'#++*)6#,-&$',+ %' #. )$
?C3@@@+&&%,+') &)9)+*)&)&!+')#**<'+%+*6%
&,%)+-  %%1%&,') &))+3.)%)&!+')#**
++- %++ %-# ++'+%+%.*& %+&)(,*+
)/$ %+ &%:++'588...6 %6&$8$1 %8B@AB@B8") *9
) *. "8'+%+9+)&##9+&##9&%9,* %***6+$#;6	- %') &))+-,*
,&% %&&*+ % + %+$6
%&+ %#*3."%..&,#
 % + +'+%+)9/$%&#&+# + + &%&)#&%+ $6
*++#$%+%&&% + &%*&%&,)* &+)+%+&)&'&,)
&,%+)*, +6
+%+%,$)4C9AB
&)') &% %9
&,*&)- *"+%+*
:);3&$'+ + &%
$&%*))*= *
')++0 %+%*=
 * *"0+&&+ % %#-) %*6'+%+*)+&%#0**+*
&.%3%+0' ##0+ )'#% *+&/'#& + + %*+$%0%%+* %&))+&
+&&)+&)+,)%&%+ %-*+$%+6
0&,%*,**,##0++"+
'+%+3+%0&,-)+%&*,** %+*&)+#*+) %
#&.&*+*++#$%+6+& %-&#-0&,)% %)*%+)0+& %&&
*0*+$)+++*%&+%&)+6.)&$'% **&,##&&"+&
+&#)&$'% * %+ )*'&)*0*+$)+6&&23&&#3%$1&%
%&+)*)+0' ##0. ## %%#+&')&- )#0*0*+$)+ %+

%+)%+*'6&%<+) +&)&,++&+&*&$'% *&)') &))+6
++$%'*3&%<+*'%#&+&$&%0&% +6
 +<**0+& %
' &') &))+3&&) +3,+-%<+)++$%0*+&) *&) %+
+)&##&.06
%& +  %+#03$0%+0%$ 6
&$ % %)*&,)*##&.*&)&9%%+*+&*) %# + + &%&*+*3
') &))+3 %&)$+ &%%&-)##*+)+060*+# * %%  %+
&##&)+ &%$&#3# + + &%*&*+*%*'# +$&%*+$%0
%%+*6 + &%##03%%+*$0*"&%+) ,+ &%*)&$
 %+)*++ )')+ *6 $ %50%&+*&)+%%0+ %3/'+0
##&. %++) %-#  +0%*&)#**$&%06) *) #%&
, #6&$%+&&%++&+)%%+*3$&*+&. .)%&+
 )+&$'+ +&)*3%*" %+$+&!& %. + $%*))*&,)*6
=
.&,#+##+$++.-$,+,# %+)*+3=* ) #%6&)&%
*, +3) #%$%+&')*,##+&9%%+*+& +3-%
+&,$%0 % + ##0.%++&*++#
:++'588...6 %6&$8$1 %8B@AB@B8") *9) *. "8'+%+9+)&##9+&##9&%9
,* %***6+$#;6
#+ -#0*06,%

%+)%+*)&)#&*3
%.*)+ #*0
!&,)%# *+*%##+
,+&)*6$&)
&),))%+# + + &%6
&'#.%++&+#"%
*) %&)$+ &%*)
**')$ +64&&,+
&'&"+&*+
&##&)+ &%*%&&.%* /'+&)+ $*'%+&%!& %+%*+ - + *6
"**%*-% ##++''%* * %&)$#+#'&%&$$,% + &%6
.)++%&%9') - #&$$,% + &% * *&-)#3&.-)6*')+&
!& %+%*3*$##&$'%0%&++ #&%#))%%+%=&&%
# *,''&)+6=,+#& *+ *%&$'# +6
+* $'&)+%+&)')+ *+&-
+ ) %+)*+*# %6
%*&)+5*,)0&,)%&++#*+&%#+++
%6
          60 New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute
	
 

#'(&"(
  "((
8&,!/
/9
!"6)(
#"(((
!")()&&
!"6)(
) & (#"' !"6)(
	 
  
	

 "#&$#'(&"(!"'((*  "8$("(&,!"(#"/"(&
$&('&*+/$#'(&"(&*+/#*&)'"''&*+9&%)'(  #+'
#((&(#!$"'"(&$&('(#"* $("(' -'
(&(-*"'')/+(#)(*"(# ((2)&(&/&%)'("
(("#"''&($("('&,!"'"''(&#"!''(#'2
!"1-$  -*#&&) "#"6*+"AG7BD!#'2
,!$ 1#(( ')'$"&)&-B@AC/"("#&(#
'(( ( !#&>FE/@@@2"&()&"/'$ ""(&$&('
&,!"(#"89&%)'(+(((#  "(* (-#
$("(''#  -#"(,'("#$&#&&(2'$ *'(("
'('(+-(##!(('$&() &#" #(' "  
($$* #$&'+#& '#(&('2
,$&(&%)&'$&#&
&("&(# /
&%)&''&/&/
"",$&( 2(#
 /BE7E@	0'&%)&
FE	(#(#" 
" )"",$&(
 &(#"/B@@7C@@
(#( 2(""".
!(#$("("
(# /&#)"
CE@	/)(( '##"("'
!#&*#& '(#$$ 
$&#*'#"'
#)'#) * &#+(-#)&#(*'+(($("(2" -#
$&#&&(''(&#"/)'##  (& '(#$$ 2$'1"(#
"&&#+#&"##)(($("(2#+"'#&  1($("(')&**'/(+  
'(&#"&"($("(<' *&/&(&2#'"<('(#$(!&#!
''&(""#(&$("(2(-+#"<( +-'&"(/'#!(!'(+  2#'(
'#"+-(#(+",$&("2,$&(+  !)$&/
)(#!'+((&(&$#'' (-((($("(+  ')&**"'#!#&!2
+#) #" -)'",$&(-#)*(#)''"#(*  #&((
$("(#&($("('"#(''&("'(-#)"-#))'(+"((#!
 ) (#&()'"''!# #($("(#+"&2<!"#("#"
& -"#"((#((&(""-&)!'("2<&(&& -#"!-' 2
"-#)&'))'-#))''#!#" '<'("# #-/#"((
(')$$ &#(   -"&""("# #-"!"(((-
"!"--#)2!"1-(#$) #!#"('#')'("#&((#
(&  $2,!$ 1(*"".# )*#!$)(" (&7
$&(-#!$ "("'(#)&#(#!$"'((()  -!(
   -"&""'""&'2(#) *#!$  (!")()&&'
(#("*# *"('8(($166&'("2#!6(7
$# -6B@AC6@A6$("(7(&#  '7+"(7A@@@7#&7)'"7'""&'692
"! "-(&#  '((, )'* -'))'(#!&'&('!#&(""-(" '2
"#"<( (("('#(#"(&('')-#)&#!'"#&
*# )"(&- $2)'"''$&'')&'& /"-#)&#!$"-'!$#&("(
"#)-#)!-( $'$((' !&'/(2') )''!  &
')$$ &!("#("#+2#'(!")()&&'+"((#$&#(((&)'(#!&'
"'("7)$#&(&$&#)('2##"(("+('#) (& $&(-"
"(&'("(("(!(#('&(((2#!$"''#) ("
#)(((!#&$&#(* -222+""(&""(##!!& #"(&('/!
')&(#'$$&#$&("!"('#&#*&#$("( ((#"2
  -#)&'(#&-2#!$"''#) #!!''#""&(&( ',$ ""
("'3'*&'#"#'"+- +!&'"($) '#) 
')$$#&((""('3$#'(#"2!"1"((!#&& (* -'(2
###&+' (#(
#'-'(#&#$('')(& 2%) -2
(($166(#!##&2#!6B@AC6@F6@B6+-7!7"#(7$-"7(7(&#  7(#  62&(
&( '(( ((3'&# "$&$()("(&#  "'(&(-/"
!$'.(4#*#)'"''6&(#$("('''&(/(,7 
!$ (#"'#(&#  "(*(-#"*&-- /,(#&(#"&-'$(#
"'7#'('(( !"('/:";)"!"( )"&"''"*")'#$$"
"!"-$("(''25&( ''#) ("')!(((#  /
("# #-""& "(&'(!."'"#)&" '2"-$) 
#!!"(''#)  '#(* -'#)&(&#  "/((!$((#'&
"#&!(#"/"*#(#&$("(&#&!
"! #&$#"((2(&" &#("'&#)$2"#)&#(&'(#
!" $&#!!")()&&6')$$&7!) ($ !"'&+((
&') ('2 #/&$) "(&'(&#)$'/ # &$#&(&'7(#& #&'"
((&$#&(&'2  $) "(&'(&#)$' /(2+#" #-#)&
'(#&-"((#)(#&&$#&(&'(#$)$2
          61 New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute
	
 

$"%!#)$
))))$'#.
#'!
"#7*)
!'+#
,))'
"#7*)
$#=)())!0
$#(*
*)
 ($+'.
'&*()(
*)
	 
  
	

$"%!#$*)%')$'.$'8)+$'.()$)())
))$'#.#'!3"#2#+'.()8$*%!$"$#)('$"'()
$"%!#))$)$#3-"%!2'"$#)0##($)0#'( (
+#+())	#$!$.
#+()"#)(#)((*('($'
+$!)#+'$*($#(*"''$))$#())*)(0!!#)))##)(
##)((')$#($'*#'#%)+)'%')(3
#
%')*!'0$*#)())! $(%).$*)#!!#'#"#)0
"##-((+!#(#0$#)#!!)')(,%'$+)$
"%).0$'$#)#*#'($#!.($')!#($'%."#)".
$#(')$#!3
#"!0*)!%(.$*
$'.$*'!#)',!!8
$##)0$'
%')*!'!.(."%))
:33#$#8%'$)0!$#8
)'""!.*(#((1
)# %$!)!%$)$$%
+!*;
$$,#(3(.#"%$')#)3))(') ###'(##)'()0
#$,())")$)#)$*3
!!)(%')$)>($'%$#>#(
%%'$88" .$*'(!($%$($#$*())'$!!,!!"$+$#)$#$)'
+)"3
#+')$*))(,$*!,$' 0*))'!!.(#)+3'$!!
#)'$((8'((''')$)('(%$#((>(<()$'"0>#!'!.
%!.'$!#)(($#)$(*(%#!!!#(#"#(3 .(#
!)$%$#))$%')($)!))'))'!($')!()"(!#0%'%(
.$"(($#3$)))#)
##$+)$!))$#($)')$!!)$( #(
$!#(#))(
+$!)$#0#!3

!,.''%'(#)#)'$!!!'!. #$,(#$)#$*).$*'%'$*)$'
$%')$#(*)(#((#!))'0$#('+#)!#)$)(3
$()())'$'#/)$#(" )%')).(.)$'()((*3
#"! #!.%%!()$)"$()'$*(((0#$)'($'%$#))3
))!#,)(!!$,()")$))())!"#)(%'#),#
((')#)'%)#)(#()!)')')$"%#(3*')'0)%'$+(
(,)()$%'%)*))'%')$'.+$'*()'
*(#(("$!'"#(%'$)!3"#2%$)#)!!..'(0$'$*!
($')3-"%!2,=(!'0#0"'
*#&*()').#DBBG2#$))$())!,)%)#))'$!!(3+'3#
!+(05)#))'$!!#((*%$##(#')!*)
*#'+!$%'$)!,3()','+)((()$
+')9#)'$*%%!0#!($)!(!)+'$'"$#)' 9)
()'$*'$#$".,!!$"%))+#)(')!'36
:))%277'()#3$"7)8%$!.7DBCE7BC7$,8#,8'*(8)8
($%%#8')8%)#)8#8(+8$#!#8')!7;3
#"#)*.8#(
 .0$*!$()"!!$#(

.$*#$')0)4()()))3,'!))'(#)*)*'3$"%#(
))" ($"#$(%%')$(,')'$!!(*)(3*)$"%#(#)$
*#'()#,)).'))#)"(!+(#)$8!$)$%$%!+*%F
"$#)(#3.'!!.#($"-%'#,))%)#)(.()"3!!.
)! )$!,.'3
)=(!$)$,$' *)0.$*#%*!!)$0)'$%%')$
')*'#(3*)(2((')#)$'.0*)(#$)%')!3+#)$(
,$(.).$#=)())!0).)!$)$)')(0*!)")!.$(3#
'#"#)$)())()$(.0.$*'$*)($0)'.)$!))
)'$*!"$#()'*)$#3#(')).$*#,#($" .)'"(#
'"$'+$'!())!"#)$'%$()$#.$*'(!,!!$'(*""'.
*"#)3
#0()$'.(*()()))(*!))$,#!"$#()'*)$#
'*"#)(#(*""'.*"#)(!"$()#+''#)0($.$*+)$
%'%')$!)))'$*)'!3
 ($+'.'&*()($*($#)'!$,#'(7$#)'$!!'($))'$!!8
))()')##)$)"3!($"#!!!#('"#)(7())!"#)
'"#)((+#$'($#!'$.!).3.$#=),#).$*)$
 #$,)))'3"#2#&* !.#())!"#).#"3-"%!2
',*')(0$*#'$' 3$"0,((*.$$(''.)*'!
($*'(3)'*')("(+'!($+'.'&*()(0( #$$(''.
)$%'$+0$'-"%!0('#($)("$#()')#' 3$"=(+$!)$#$
)%)#)88))'$!!$')$'$%)!,(*)0%.#@B)$())!3
'(0*))#
-%#(+3
()(($")'$!!(,')*')(8)'*(#(("$!3*)2*(
($+'.(($-%#(+0)())')$#%'$')$)!#$!,(*)$'
)'$*#$'"!##!($$""*#)$#3)(0!,.($%#)$
'($!*)$#3*().(*((#)(0.$*".+$)3
          62 New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute
	
 

 )'#
$&#''#&
 !
)(
"#)"' )(
!#(#" )(5#'(6)(
	 
  
	

* "&  -&%)&'""(&$&'+($((&"#;&(&";
7+" )'! &)/+&&)/",(#&(#"8/)'#$&#''
&%)&'$&#''711/#!$ "(/'#*&-8(('!$&#$&"(
#&"&-#)&'#$&#"'"5#&''#)((##("#  (& 
*"(1,!$ 0"'#*1""#*(#711  1A?@A8/'#2'
#)"(& !  /11/$((&"#''&(#"#,$&$("('/''&(#"
#$("(' &-,)'(-$&#& "''(#*"#&'/"*# (#"#
# (#"'(# "'#"(&!'1
  #"'(#'(#(& /
'#!(!'"
&- 1
&-) (/"#(#&*&-'()(#"/)(")'(#&'+&"''#
(('1)(#(&)"&)'"''$&(' !''#" '
'((!"('5#!''#"'#!(& (" "'"#!!)"(#"'#) +#&1
"#(&'#&$#"!")*&1)(0	)'()((&#)(''#&('#
!#(#"'"&#)(#)((&#  (('"")'"-"!'/*"
) (!( -)"')'') 1-#)"#&(!/('&##(#&""
$) "(&'(&#)$'!-+   "!)'&#"-#)& 1
""(''#) ""(*'!"!"(-"(-"
#'('& -/"'( '""'("(#$&6'( ((#")(1"
#)"' ((' &-""'(($ "((#""'1
#":($#)"' '#"(& /"#+(()""- +-&((
('(##""' "+(-#)& #"6(&!+  6"/"'"#(
#" -')$$#&("-#)#&$("( ((#"'&*'1!"0!!(/"
-#)&!#"( -  5&)&)"&(
&".(#"/'(-"#"
(#$#-#)&
,$"''5#)('
#)"' 
(*'!"!"('-1#":( (( +-&' -#)1"#"(&'(/
'(-"*# */!('(&('#"'/"!"('1(+  
 $-#)(&(#'('"!')&-#)&#"#" -+('"''&-(#
+"1&-(#"#((,$&'&*')$&#"(/11,#  &'#&$&#&&(
'&/,#  &'(#"#(('(( !"(/(1 '#/((+#&"6#)'1#&
,!$ /+(6'#*&-/#!$"'"#$-/'&"/"#")((&'(
&*+"6#)'(& #+&#'(("(+#) #& & +&!(#
#!$ (('!(''1)'(  '("&#&""+  ) 
"&"!"('/#!$"''#) #)'#"'&""#" -#&$&* 
""#(+'((!#"'#*&-('1
) @@'"(#"'"3,$(#" '4')"&BD1119AFD1
,!$ 0"#"6(*1 '(&"#&$71&1A?@@8/) @@'"(#"'
#=@C@/GFC1E?+&)$ +&((&#   (#&'#" -"*'((
#& "/"$&''#(* -' ''"&"!"(  (#"'1
& &)(&!(,$(#" '(&!"(#"#"('!
''/')&" '(&2'+&#=CFG/@D?1CF1
AD6B?
 '' #"'#(/"#" -*  (-$  --#)&($&* "$&(-/
)($("!"#&&#)'''1#)")'((&(#'"(#"'"
'"& -#"*&'(#"'+('/$&() & -+&-#)*##$&#&
&((#)$-#)&  (#"'1)(0	)'()((&#)(''#&('#
!#(#"'"&#)(#)((&#  (('"")'"-"!'/*"
) (!( -)"')'') 1-#)"#&(!/('&##(#&""
$) "(&'(&#)$'!-+   "!)'&#"-#)& 1
          63 New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute
	
 

"! 
""
"""!
	 
  
	

'#!"")"  # "!""#"" !"
#"# '# #!!!""!""
""!+
'0""#"%""'%"#""0!""-"
" !'$"!' "!+&* %# "!
 + #!"!!!#  " '!"""
+!!#  !)"!  '%
.""*,,%%%++,(,312313, !- !%,""-" -"--
#!!!!+"/+
 "
$ !"!#"
" !% *	'# '"" )'# ""+" 
"#"#%$ !)-! ")""')-
#!!%"#"""!"$# "# +""
""  !!--" !+!!$ 
""!" "!%!" "!)$ ""!
#   ""#"# +""!--"$"!"" 0!
#!!!%#!!"#"# "!+!!
$#'%'+"$"""!#!"+0" "%%'-
-" !0"%""" '!!#!"'%!""!+#"*

!# ""$ "" """!)"#!""!!! "+
"!)'# !! !"" "  ")#"""
!"!"#"""" +!)"$  '# 
$#)#'# $ !!# !)'# !" #" !)'# 
#!" !+!! ""' "!""#"$"
"""'!# ! "! #"!,! $! !+
          64 New America Foundation
 PatentFreedom maintains a comprehensive database of patent litigations, focusing on NPEs, which it de4nes 
as “any entity that earns or plans to earn the majority of its revenue from the licensing or enforcement of its patents.” 
PatentFreedom’s database capabilities enable it to track patent litigation campaigns that use the same set of patents 
asserted against a series of operating companies over time. Using this information, the company generated a list of the 
top patent litigation campaigns, based on number of defendants named, initiated between January 1, 2010 and June 
30, 2013.  For each of the 15 campaigns, the company identi4ed a total of 813 patent infringement lawsuits 4led as 
part of the campaigns, broken into 2,889 individual operating company parties.  3e company tagged each operating 
company party as either a ‘customer’ (implementer or end-user) or a ‘supplier’ based upon a manual review of the 
following three data 4elds:
1. the underlying technology covered in each campaign based on a quick review of the patents-in-suit;
2. the industry of the operating company party (derived from their self-reported primary NAICS codes);
3. the allegedly infringing products captured from the 4led complaints.
 As an illustration, a so6ware company, whose web-based email products (built by the company itself) were 
alleged to be infringing patents covering web-based messaging features, was tagged as a ‘supplier’.  On the other 
hand, a retail company (whose core products/services clearly do not include email products) sued for implementing 
a similar web-based messaging feature on its website based on following the instructions of a technology vendor 
on its website, or a company that used an o5-the-shelf product as instructed by the manufacturer, was tagged as a 
‘customer’. For a minority of cases where one or more of the three data 4elds were not available, the company used 
other available information, such as the company’s website, to estimate its industry or products and services, and 
make the determination.  While the majority of cases were clear, some were arguable and not easy to determine. 
3e company then analyzed the entire data set to calculate the percent distribution of the total number of operating 
companies sued in each campaign into ‘customers’ vs. ‘suppliers.’
                 Appendix D: PatentFreedom  
          Methodology for Counting Customer Suits
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